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BROKEN LIVES FROM BROKEN WINDOWS:
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF AGGRESSIVE
ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING
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ABSTRACT

In this article I demonstrate that the aggressive policing of misdemeanor
and lesser offenses results in a number of consequences that may ultimately
be criminogenic. These effects can roughly be broken down into two
categories: economic burdens and legitimacy costs. I conclude that while the
impact of aggressive policing of minor offenses on crime rates requires more
study, the costs associated with policing order via the criminal justice system
are so great that immediate steps must be taken to reduce them.
Recently, scholars in the field of criminal justice have grappled with
three major developments that have significantly changed the landscape of
the criminal justice system. These developments are (1) increased policing
of minor social disorder based on the Broken Windows theory, (2) insights
based on social psychology in the area of procedural justice, and (3) the
expansion of civil collateral consequences of convictions. This paper
explores the interplay between these three developments.
In the policing sphere, the Broken Windows theory-the theory
that correcting visible signs of social disorder will reduce serious
crime-has given rise to aggressive order-maintenance policing
strategies in many jurisdictions. Such policing has drawn millions of
individuals into the criminal justice system for minor offenses. Social
psychologists have contemporaneously produced compelling evidence
that perceptions and judgments about "procedural justice"-the
fundamental fairness of a process-have a greater impact on willingness
to comply with authority than favorable outcomes (e.g., light sentences
Finally, scholars, judges,
or even dismissal in a criminal case).
prosecutors, and defense attorneys have written with concern about
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civil collateral consequences that often outweigh and outlast underlying
criminal convictions.
This article examines these three developments. Using New York City
as a case study, I assess the panoply of aggressive order-maintenance
policing costs in light of both procedural justice costs and the collateral
consequences.
I reach two conclusions.
First, aggressive ordermaintenance policing likely exerts criminogenic pressure on the targets of
aggressive policing and the neighborhoods from which they come. Second,
many of the unintended and undesirable costs of aggressive ordermaintenance policing can be mitigated or eliminated without abandoning a
commitment to order maintenance.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to the costs of
incarceration1 fueled by, among other things, the "war on drugs," inflexible
state and federal sentencing guidelines, "three strikes" laws, and similar
"tough on crime" legislation. The cost, effectiveness, necessity, and
community impact of these felony sentencing policies have been examined
at length by a number of scholars.2 This trend, along with state budget
1. By incarceration, I refer to imprisonment of one year or more. There were over 1.5
million prisoners in state and federal prisons on December 31, 2007. HEATHER C. WEST &
WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 224280,
PRISONERS IN 2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf. In
addition, approximately 800,000 people were in American jails either awaiting trial or
serving sentences of less than a year on that date. See id. With 756 out of every 100,000
residents in prison or jail, the United States has the highest imprisonment rate in the world.
Int'l Ctr. for Prison Studies, King's Coll. London, World Prison Brief,
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/wpb-stats.php
(select "Entire
world" and "Prison population rates") (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
2. See, e.g., INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (examining the many
ramifications of felony convictions for convicts, families, and communities); PAULA C.
JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON 17 (2003)

(providing female felons' narratives on the impact of incarceration in order to "stimulat[e]
reconsideration of the near-exclusive reliance on incarceration for crimes in our society");
MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 13 (2d ed. 2006) (examining

the same with a focus on "the wide-ranging effects of the race to incarcerate on African
American communities in particular"); Nora V. Demleitner, PreventingInternalExile." The
Need for Restrictions on CollateralSentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
153 (1999) (discussing the negative and extensive effects of excluding ex-offenders from
political and economic realms); Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal
Effects of Crime and Incarcerationin New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1551, 1552 (2003) (examining high incarceration rates within a community as a factor
that increases crime and perpetuates "the accumulation of social and economic adversity
for people living in these areas"); Dorothy E. Roberts, CriminalJustice and Black Families:
The CollateralDamage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1028 (2001)
(discussing the same with a focus on current incarceration policies' "disproportionate
disruption of Black families"); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
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crises, has given rise to significant movements for sentencing reform and
alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent felony offenders in many state
systems.3 Yet overlooked in the deluge of commentary on the costs of
tough-on-crime policies are the effects and costs of aggressive ordermaintenance policing strategies that target misdemeanor and noncriminal
offenses. 4 These policies affect millions of people in the United States
each year,5 resulting in more convictions than for more serious crimes6 and
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2004)
(discussing how racial disparities in incarceration of adults disrupt black families, causing
devastating collateral damages to entire communities).
3. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalismand the Politicsof Sentencing, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1276, 1285-90 (2005) (noting that over half the states have reformed their
sentencing and incarceration polices in some way, including Alabama, Louisiana, and New
Mexico, which have amended three strikes laws due to cost); DANIEL F. WILHELM &
NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IS THE BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY
(2002),
available at
SENTENCING
AND
INCARCERATION?
WE
LOOK
AT

http://www.vera.org/publication-pdf/167_263.pdf (surveying various attempts by lawmakers
to reduce corrections spending).
4. A misdemeanor is a minor offense, excluding traffic infractions, which is punishable
by no more than one year in jail and more often than not is punished by little or no jail
time. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney Supp. 2008). Lesser offenses include traffic
infractions and violations, the latter of which cannot be punished by more than fifteen days
in jail. Id. § 10.00(2)-(3).
5. Of over fourteen million arrests nationwide reported to the FBI in 2005, only about
2.2 million arrests were for FBI Uniform Crime Reports Index Crimes. FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Table 29. EstimatedNumber of Arrests, in CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005 (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_29.html
[hereinafter FBI, Table 2q. These Index Crimes include eight serious offenses: four violent
crimes (murder and non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) and four
property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson). FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, About the UCR Program,in CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2005, supra, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/about/aboutucr.html [hereinafter FBI,
About the UCR]. Roughly 600,000 of the arrests were for violent index crimes, and 1.6
million were for property index crimes. FBI, Table 29, supra. The remaining 11.9 million
arrests included, among other minor offenses, 670,000 arrests for disorderly conduct;
550,000 for drunkenness; 270,000 for vandalism; 590,000 for violation of liquor laws; 140,000
for curfew and loitering violations; and 3.8 million arrests that fall into a category defined as
"[a]ll other offenses." Id, While some small portion of the 11.9 million non-index crimes
may be relatively serious, millions of these arrests were for misdemeanor and lesser
offenses. Id
6. Nationwide statistics for the number of misdemeanor convictions are not
maintained by the FBI, but there are many million. The U.S. Department of Justice's
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) estimates that over sixty-four million individuals
(about 30% of the adult population of the United States) have criminal records.
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN.,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 51 (2006) (citing 2001 BJS
The FBI
estimates), available at www.usdoj.gov/olp/ag-bgchecks-report.pdf.
fingerprint database has forty-eight million individuals. Id. at 13. In New York in
2004, only 12.7% of all convictions were for felonies. SPECIAL COMM. ON COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, RE-ENTRY AND
REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SAFETY 380-81 (2006) [hereinafter NYSBA
RE-ENTRY REPORT], available at http://www.nysba.org (follow "Publications/Forms"
hyperlink; then follow "Substantive Reports" hyperlink; then select title of report).
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constituting the most common point of contact between the public and the
criminal justice system. The most aggressive of these policies permit
arrests for offenses not even punishable by jail time.7
This paper argues that policing minor offenses so aggressively creates
significant hidden costs that undermine the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system, create substantial burdens for poor people (the majority of
those arrested for order offenses), and erect barriers to education and
employment.
In addition to the loss of legitimacy and diminished
economic opportunities, another result of aggressive order-maintenance
policing may be an increase in crime and disorder. Determining whether
and to what extent the latter hypothesis is correct requires longitudinal
study and is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper examines
the process and results of arrest for minor offenses in terms of costs to
arrestees and to the broader community. Procedural justice research by
social psychologists informs the explanation of why aggressive policing of
misdemeanor and lesser offenses is likely to undermine compliance with
the criminal law.
Procedural justice research establishes that the perception of being
treated fairly is more important than a favorable outcome in predicting
whether a person views authority as legitimate.8 Legitimacy, in turn, is
critical in predicting willingness to abide by the law.9 Individuals make
judgments about procedural fairness and legitimacy based on a number of
factors.1" Unfortunately for the criminal justice system and for the millions
of people subjected to summary arrest each year for minor and
noncriminal order-maintenance offenses, the processing of minor offenses
bears few of the hallmarks associated with perceptions of procedural

See also id. at 381 ("[Slome of the most draconian consequences follow from
misdemeanors and non-criminal violations.").
7. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324-25, 354 (2001) (affirming
police authority to make warrantless arrests for petty offenses punishable only by fine;
here, failure to wear seatbelt and carry license and proof of insurance).
8. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Princeton Univ. Press 2006)

(1990). See also Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of ProceduralJustice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513 (2003)
(demonstrating through empirical studies that public reaction to police depends largely on
police legitimacy, and that police legitimacy depends largely on fairness of police
procedures).
9. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in LAWRENCE W.
SHERMAN, DENISE GOTTFREDSON, DORIS MACKENZIE, JOHN ECK, PETER REUTER &
SHAWN BUSHWAY, UNIV. OF MD., PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T,
WHAT'S PROMISING: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 8-1 (1997), available at

http://www.ncjrs.gov/docfiles/wholedoc.doc (arguing that perception of police legitimacy
affects rates of serious crime more drastically than many tactics of increased police
presence).
10. Seeinfra Part III.A.
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fairness." Furthermore, collateral consequences associated with even
minor arrests have become so pervasive, severe, and long-lasting that they
violate notions of proportionality. 12 In addition to collateral consequences,
the direct costs of arrest, processing, and either disposition by plea or an
attempt to contest charges are high. These costs are high even when the
official sanction is low or nonexistent. The decision to pursue aggressive
arrest-based order-maintenance campaigns that sweep millions into the
criminal justice system must include an assessment of how the procedural
justice, collateral costs, and direct costs of these policies may affect society.
This paper addresses those issues.
In order to examine the panoply of costs of aggressive ordermaintenance policies, this article uses New York City as a case study.
Though I focus on New York City, the inquiry is relevant throughout the
state, across the nation, and around the world as many jurisdictions adopt
increasingly rigid approaches to disorder. 3 In this article, I identify a
number of burdens that are not necessary for effective order-maintenance
policing and that, if eliminated, would not compromise any quality-of-life
benefits or increase crime, but would rather decrease the disproportionate
and accordingly unjust consequences that flow from arrest for
misdemeanors and lesser offenses.
In Part I of this article, I will examine some of the underpinnings of
New York's quality-of-life policing policies. Part II will examine the daily
arrest numbers in New York City in recent years and use the contrast
between "slow arrest days" and "busy arrest days" to examine the impact
of aggressive policing. How many people are being arrested? For what
offenses? With nearly 85% nonwhite arrestees, what is the racial impact of
such aggressive policing? The procedural justice implications and costs to
the police, criminal justice system, individuals accused, and their
communities are examined in Part III. Finally, in Part IV, I will suggest a
number of ways to reduce these costs to enhance, rather than undermine,
compliance with the law, respect for the criminal justice system, and the
ability of courts to administer justice in misdemeanor cases.

11. The lack of process in lower criminal courts is not a new development, nor does it
appear to be entirely the result of caseload. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS
IS THE PUNISHMENT 261 (paperback ed. 1992) (comparing case processing in high-volume
Connecticut courts with low-volume courts).
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. For more on other jurisdictions adopting aggressive order-maintenance policing
tactics, see Tim Newburn, Atlantic Crossings: 'Policy Transfer' and Crime Control in the
USA and Britain, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 165, 167 (2002) (discussing influence of New
York policing and limited experiments with "zero tolerance policing" in the United
Kingdom), and BILL DIXON, THE GLOBALISATION OF DEMOCRATIC POLICING: SECTOR
POLICING
AND
ZERO
TOLERANCE
IN
THE
NEW
SOUTH
AFRICA
(2000),
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/sjrp/publicat/globall.htm.
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I.
ZERO TOLERANCE POLICING
4
In 1994 New York City adopted "Zero Tolerance Policing" (ZTP)1
for minor quality-of-life offenses, one of a range of policing strategies
rooted in the "Broken Windows" theory set forth in the article of the same
name by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. 15 According to the
Broken Windows theory, physical and social disorder (broken windows in
houses or factories, abandoned lots, begging, loitering, and public drinking
or urination) gives rise to fear, which leads inhabitants to stay at home and
sends a signal to more serious criminals that no one cares about a block or
16 This increases the
neighborhood.
likelihood of serious crimes in such
17

areas.

Accordingly, the Broken Windows theory encourages police to focus
on maintaining order both to counteract fear of crime and to combat crime
itself. Prevention of petty offenses to order will, the theory predicts,
reduce fear and win community confidence, while also reducing serious
crime attracted by disorder."8 Whether aggressive order-maintenance
policing is responsible for any part of the drop in index crimes19 in the last
fifteen years is highly contested.2" This is not surprising, given the evidence
14. "Zero Tolerance Policing" is the practice of intervening to prevent disorder by
means of summary arrest. See WILLIAM BRATrON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND:
How AMERICA'S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 228-29 (1998) (describing

"Police Strategy Number 5 'Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York' as explicitly
adopting a policy of arresting people for minor offenses, including panhandling, fare
evasion, trespassing, public consumption of alcohol, and public urination).
15. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
NeighborhoodSafety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
16. Id, at 31-32.
17. Id. at 32.
18. Id. at 34.
19. "Index crimes" refers to FBI Uniform Crime Reports Index Crimes, which include
eight serious offenses: murder and non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. FBI, About the UCR, supra
note 5.
20. For a thorough review of the ambiguous evidence that ZTP was actually responsible
for the crime drop in New York City, see John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes
in PolicingReduced Violent Cime? An Assessment of the Evidence,in THE CRIME DROP IN
AMERICA 207,226-28 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., rev. ed. 2006) (concluding that
the effectiveness of ZTP "remains untested" because "[m]any strategies designed to lower the
crime rate were implemented simultaneously, including: the quality-of-life initiative, hiring
more officers, Compstat... and a variety of crime-specific efforts"). Other, better-supported
explanations for the drop in crime include changes in demographics, shifts in the economy,
preexisting anti-narcotics policing activity, and incapacitation. Id See also Steven D. Levitt,
Understanding Why Crme Fell in the 1990s. FourFactorsthat Explain the Decline and Six
that Do Not, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2004, at 163 (attributing drop in crime to increased
number of police, decreased use of crack, increased incarceration, and legalized abortion; and
discounting policing strategies such as order-maintenance because crime dropped in both
cities that adopted these strategies and cities that did not).
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available at the time the article appeared. In the 1982 Broken Windows
article, Wilson and Kelling develop their theory based on a project which
placed foot patrols in several Newark, New Jersey neighborhoods. These
police served an important role in order-maintenance and, although crime
did not go down, residents in the neighborhood became significantly less
fearful.2' These results are consistent with research that confirms that fear
of crime is not actually closely related to the likelihood of victimization.22
Rather, fear may reflect the accumulated burden of "urban unease," as
early researchers in this field defined fear.2 3 Fear is the result of the
perception that an area is unpoliced and out of control and that the
community is not responsive to these problems. It is the result of the
perceived "threats" presented by the beggar, the homeless person, the
mentally ill person, the drunk or drug addict, or the group of kids blocking
the sidewalk. 24 Because fear occurs on an individual basis, "[t]hose who
are much more afraid than their neighbors are the ones who are
contributing most to fear, ''25 as measured in the aggregate for the
neighborhood. Thus, fear can theoretically be significantly reduced by
reducing these perceived threats regardless of whether the actual
likelihood of victimization is decreased.26
Despite the fact that the very experiment in order-maintenance
policing27 that was the basis for the Broken Windows article showed no
effect on serious crime, the authors hypothesized that reduction in disorder
would cause an actual reduction in crime. 28 The debate about whether
crime reduction is achieved by either order-maintenance generally or ZTP

21. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 15, at 29.
22. The notion that fear is reduced for a neighborhood and hence all of its members
ignores two important aspects of fear reduction. First, susceptibility to fear is a highly
individual trait and varies from neighbor to neighbor; therefore, to speak of a fear level for
a given neighborhood overlooks the wide range of individual levels of fear within that
neighborhood. See RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS 368
(2001). See also BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 14, at 151 (discussing polls showing that
while 2-3% of all crime took place in subways, women believed the figure was 40-50% and
men estimated 30-40%). Second, the community is made up of any number of groups that
may react differently to order-maintenance policing. Thus, while fear may be reduced for
elderly residents, or young single women, fear may be increasedfor teenage boys and their
parents because of the aggressive policing of the young male portion of the population.
23. See TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 368.
24. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 15, at 29-30.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. "Order-maintenance policing" includes aggressive order-maintenance policing or
ZTP but does not necessarily depend on criminalization and summary arrest to achieve
order. For example, in Broken Windows, the authors describe the police talking to
disorderly civilians, enforcing informal rules without making arrests, and making arrests
when disorderly citizens harassed others. Wilson & Kelling, supranote 15, at 30-31.
28. Id.at 38.
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specifically is one that will likely never be resolved.2 9 While a significant
drop in serious crime has occurred while ZTP has been in effect in New

York City, a similar drop in crime has taken place in jurisdictions that have
not adopted ZTP.3 ° Furthermore, the drop in crime began before ZTP or
other significant order-maintenance policing was adopted in New York
City. 31 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a number of other
significant crime prevention approaches were adopted roughly
concurrently to ZTP in New York City, and it is impossible to definitively
attribute serious crime reduction to any one of these programs. Even the
architect of ZTP in New York City, former NYPD Commissioner William
Bratton, has indicated that the interplay of various aggressive policing
strategies, including targeting and gathering information on guns,
following crime patterns with Compstat (NYPD's computerized statistics
crime mapping technology),3" and youth anticrime efforts, caused crime to
drop in New York City.3 3 While there are those who would attribute much

of the crime drop in New York City to order-maintenance policing,34
others see no solid evidence to support such a conclusion.

Whether the

29. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject. A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and OrderMaintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) (replicating Wesley
Skogan's empirical study that claimed to prove that order-maintenance policing reduced
serious crime and concluding that the statistics did not support this conclusion); Robert J.
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A
New Look at Disorderin Urban Neighborhoods,105 AM. J. Soc. 603, 607 (1999) (noting
that empirical studies indicate that disorder may be a part of crime rather than a cause).
30. In some of these jurisdictions, other, less aggressive, forms of order-maintenance
policing have been adopted, such as community policing and problem-oriented policing.
See Eck & Maguire, supranote 20, at 226 (noting that Boston, San Diego, and Washington,
D.C., all experienced significant drops in index crimes using policing strategies other than
aggressive order-maintenance policing). See also CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
SHATTERING

"BROKEN WINDOWS": AN ANALYSIS OF SAN FRANCISCO'S ALTERNATIVE

CRIME POLICIES 3-4 (1999), http://www.cjcj.org/files/shattering.pdf (noting that San
Francisco experienced a drop in violent crimes similar to New York City's with a
simultaneous decrease in misdemeanor arrests).
31. Eck & Maguire, supra note 20, at 226 (citing examples such as getting guns off the
street and increasing the number of police officers).
32. BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 14, at 219-22, 227-30.
33. Id. at 290.
34. See, e.g., George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter?. An
Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms, 22 MANHATTAN INST. FOR
POL'Y RES. Civic REP. 1 (2001), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr-22.pdf (citing
correlation between high misdemeanor arrest rates precinct-by-precinct and a drop in crime
as proof of Broken Windows theory). See also id at 18 (interpreting empirical survey to
demonstrate "that citizens broadly support the 'broken windows' point of view" (emphasis
added)).
35. Harcourt, supra note 29; Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows:
New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
271 (2006) (concluding that order-maintenance policing does not reduce crime or affect
criminal behavior).
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drop in serious crime is a result of ZTP (or, as is most likely the case,
partially the result of ZTP),36 there can be no doubt that one primary aim
of ZTP, reduction in disorder and reduction of fear-as-urban-unease in
New York City, has been achieved to some extent.3" To judge ordermaintenance policing by its effect on "serious crime" overlooks the
benefits in the form of reduced disorder and fear.38 A final wrinkle in
evaluating order-maintenance policing is the recognition that ordermaintenance policing and ZTP are not necessarily one and the same.
Broken Windows focused on physical disorder (broken windows and
abandoned lots) and non-arrest interventions in social disorder (police
asking questions and enforcing informal social norms).3 9
Ordermaintenance policing as described in Broken Windows neither demands
nor suggests that zero tolerance arrest policies are efficient, desirable, or
effective methods to achieve order and reduce fear.
The focus on this secondary effect of serious crime reduction as a
justification for ZTP and other order-maintenance policing may be a
reflection of the unease that police, criminologists, lawyers (including
prosecutors), and society at large experience regarding criminally
prosecuting citizens for disorderliness. By endlessly debating the weight of
evidence supporting the indirect effect of aggressive order-maintenance
policing on serious crime, we avoid the question of whether the costs of
order-maintenance policing (in any given incarnation) outweigh the
benefits.4" While articles questioning the benefits of aggressive order36. I do not attempt to resolve this debate, and I believe that there is no practicable
means of controlling for all variables (multiple policing innovations, demographic changes,
drug-use preferences, economic changes, community efforts, etc.) to determine what
independent contribution ZTP makes to crime reduction. In order to create an appropriately
controlled experiment to test this contribution, one would have to designate adjacent blocks
within a neighborhood, some to be policed according to ZTP for order and some to be policed
without the arrests and citations that ZTP entails. These contiguous blocks would presumably
have the same economic conditions, the same school systems, the same demographics, and be
similar in all other relevant respects. Moreover, to isolate the ZTP effect it would be
necessary to make sure that police presence is similar in the control area.
37. Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology.- The New Path of Deterrence,
95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2488 (1997) (describing ZTP as "[o]ne such policy . . . with
startlingly successful results in New York City" in terms of battling perceptions of criminal
activity); Editorial, Crimefighting Has ChangedForever,N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2001,
at 42 ("Stepped-up enforcement, plus zoning reforms, purged sex shops and led to a familyfriendly Times Square.").
38. For an article critiquing the critique of order-maintenance policing on the basis of
lack of evidence of reduction in serious crime and urging a focus on the primary benefits of
order maintenance, see David Thacher, OrderMaintenanceReconsidered-Moving Beyond
Strong CausalReasoning,94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2004).
39. See Wilson & Kelling, supranote 15, at 31.
40. Also avoided are the larger questions of the constitutionality of such policing, and
the proper reach of the criminal law. For discussions of these topics, see Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places. Courts, Communities, and the
New Policing,97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997).
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maintenance policing point out various discrete costs of this approachparticularly in terms of race relations4" and liberty interests42 -there has
been no examination of the full range of actual costs of ZTP to society, the
criminal justice system, the police, or the targets of this policing and their
families and communities. These costs include direct and collateral costs
of arrest processing as well as the costs associated with the lack of
procedural justice for minor offenses. An examination of these costs
suggests ways to minimize them without abandoning a comprehensive
approach to disorder and fear reduction.
Nor would modifications
necessarily reduce any secondary benefit in terms of reduction of serious
crime, if this benefit does exist. Indeed, if the current arrest policies lead
to judgments that undermine the legitimacy of law enforcement and legal
institutions, reforming the process associated with minor offense policing
may reduce both minor offenses and serious crimes. While some of these
costs have been noted or explored, and some solutions have been
proposed to avoid constitutional
problems of vagueness
and
overbroadness (particularly the use of civil sanctions where loitering
statutes are at issue),43 there has been no effort to examine the particular
types of arrests and their costs and to suggest diversion of offenses or
changes in handling these cases to reduce the deleterious effects of ZTP.

II.
THE STATISTICAL FACE OF AGGRESSIVE ORDER-MAINTENANCE
POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY
To evaluate the costs of aggressive order-maintenance policing, it is
necessary to determine the number of arrests' caused by the decision to
police minor offenses aggressively. We may be willing to absorb costs of
$100 or $1000 dollars for each additional minor arrest if there are only 100

41. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 2; Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73
L. REV. 669 (1998).

CHI.-KENT

42. See, e.g., Harcourt, supranote 29, at 381-84.
43. See Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing.- Confessions of a Former
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1064 (2003) (proposing search
programs not focusing on general crime control be evaluated under a "civil restraint" rubric
rather than a traditional Fourth Amendment standard); Livingston, supra note 40, at 63840 (also proposing civil sanctions to avoid constitutional vagueness challenges). For an
example of the Supreme Court invalidating a municipal loitering statute as
unconstitutional, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (holding that
legislature had to establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement and prevent
excessive discretion).
44. By "arrest" I refer to a full summary arrest, a process which typically takes about
twenty-four hours and is described further in Part III below. Those who receive
summonses or "Desk Appearance Tickets" are not included in the "arrest" statistics
discussed in this article.
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or 1000 additional arrests per year. If, however, there are 100,000
additional arrests per year due to ZTP, we may wish to explore ways to
This may be particularly true if these costs fall
reduce costs.
disproportionately on disadvantaged groups. A review of the arrest
numbers and patterns in New York City in this section of the article
demonstrates that the arrests resulting from ZTP are in the hundreds of
thousands, are for particularly minor offenses, disproportionately affect
people of color, and do not result in more seizures of weapons.
In this section I begin by looking at existing research comparing
arrests before and after ZTP was adopted, and then specific arrest patterns
from the years 2000 through 2005. The first comparison provides a sense
of the overall increase in arrests for minor offenses, and the second
examination provides a more nuanced view of daily policing patterns.45
The breakdown of ZTP arrests by offense is provided because this
information is necessary to assess whether the costs and penalties
associated with ZTP are acceptable and proportionate.
A. Comparisonof Non-FelonyArrests Before andAfter the Adoption of
Zero TolerancePolicing
The push towards ZTP has led to a change in how police exercise
discretion. Rather than issuing warnings, or choosing not to arrest
individuals for minor offenses, discretion is typically exercised in favor of
arrest.46 To examine the resulting shifts in the number of arrests, types of
offenses, demographics of arrestees, and outcomes of arrests, one can look
to the work of Freda Solomon comparing non-felony arrests in New York
City in 1989, before ZTP was adopted, to 1998, when the policy was wellentrenched.47 The most striking changes can be summarized as follows:
First, the number of non-felony4" arrests increased by approximately
90,0009.9 Before ZTP was adopted in 1989, there were approximately
86,000 non-felony arrests.5 ° In 1998, there were 176,000."'
45. The use of empirical evidence in this section is descriptive. While patterns are
examined, they are examined to give a sense of how many are arrested-who, and for what
offenses. Except for the proposition that these arrests are the result of a policing choice
(aggressive order-maintenance policing by means of summary arrest), the statistics in this
section are not intended to "prove" a causal relation.
46. See BRATrON & KNOBLER, supranote 14, at 229.
47. Freda F. Solomon, The Impact of Ouality-Of-Life Policing,N.Y. CITY CRIM. JUST.
AGENCY RES. BRIEF, Aug. 2003, at 1, availableathttp://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief3.pdf.
48. These numbers include three types of offenses: A misdemeanors (punishable by up
to one year in jail), B misdemeanors (punishable by up to six months in jail), and penal law
violations (noncriminal offenses punishable by up to fifteen days in jail). In addition to arrests
under the provisions of the New York State Penal Law code, thousands of arrests for
violations of New York City regulations are made each year but are not reported to the state.
49. Solomon, supra note 47, at 2.
50. Id.
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Second, the demographics of people arrested changed from 1989 to
1998. These changes include:
1. More people with no prior criminal records (approximately 90,000)52
2. More young people ages sixteen to twenty without prior convictions
(over 22,000)" 3
3. Proportionally fewer white54 people (from 18.9% in 1989 to 12.9%
55
in 1998)
4. Proportionally more Hispanic people (from 27% in 1989 to 32% in
1998)56

While the percentage of people arrested who were black remained
essentially unchanged at 50%, this nevertheless represents about 45,000
additional arrests of black people because of the increase in the overall
number of arrests by 90,000; this also means that the increase in Hispanic
arrests amounts to over 32,000 additional arrests.57
Third, the severity of arrest charges declined. Consistent with the
focus on offenses to order rather than harms to people or property, the
number of arrests for B misdemeanors (mostly marijuana possession)
more than quadrupled (from 9208 to 43,540) from 1989 to 1998.5' Fourth,
the outcome of these arrests also shifted in significant ways. The
percentage of cases disposed of at arraignment (the first court appearance)
increased from 62% to 73%.S9 The number of arrests that did not result in
conviction increased from 23% to 39% .60 Despite the higher dismissal rate
in 1998, there were nonetheless 42,000 more convictions in 1998 than in
1989.61 For those who received jail time in 1998, the median jail sentence
shrank from twenty days to seven days.62
Thus, as of 1998, the shift to ZTP had resulted in huge numbers of
people-largely minorities, youths, and many without criminal recordsbeing arrested and put through the system on especially minor charges,
only to have their cases disposed of at the first appearance, and often
51. Id
52. Id at 3.
53. Id at 4.
54. I use the terms "black," "Hispanic," and "white" because these are the terms
police and criminal statistics agencies in New York use.
55. Solomon, supra note 47, at 2.
56. Id at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6.
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without conviction or jail time. While proponents of ZTP might see such
treatment as relatively cost-free-after all, arrestees are walking away
without jail time or a record-Part III below explores the hidden costs of
this treatment.
B. Arrest Patternsin the Twenty-First Century
Before turning to these costs, I examine recent misdemeanor arrest
patterns to identify arrests which appear to be the result of the exercise of
discretion in favor of summary arrests. Specifically, I looked at the
statistics for daily misdemeanor arrests in New York City in the years
between 2000 and 2005. According to the New York State Division of
Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), about 1.2 million arrests were made for
misdemeanors in these six years.63 This figure is reflected in Table 1, which
lists the number of arrests by year and broad category of offense.
TABLE 1. NEW YORK CITY ARRESTS:

1998-200764

Year Total Felony Violent Misdemeanor Drug DWI Property Other
58,547
82,532 4,226 69,857
1998 1345,332130,170 42,768 215,162
1999 314,286116,955 37,420
2000 337,881113,21335,974
2001 298,620 104,126 33,782

197,331

78,353

3,465 58,873

56,640

224,668
194,494

102,712 3,434 58,502
79,903 3,452 50,571

60,020
60,568
58,318
158,850

2002 289,339 99,632
2003 278,938 89,327
2004 !282,957 92,643

31,557
29,144

189,707
189,611

28,023

190,314

80,337 3,770 47,282
72,710 4,432 53,619
62,115 6,425 55,713

2005 291,159 95,039
2006 303,414 97,156

27,672
27,516

196,120
206,258

64,085 7,105 55,830
68,879 7,925 59,422

69,100
70,032

2007 334,082 102,96228,100 1231,120

81,024 9,059 66,528

74,509

66,061

In addition to these arrests, the New York City Criminal Court reports
that about 17,000 people per year were arrested for non-printable offenses
between 2000 and 2004.65 The most common of these offenses were
63. See infraTable 1.
64. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Adult Arrests in New York
City (2008), http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnetlojsa/arrests/nyc.htm.
65. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N.Y., STATISTICS REPORT (2004) (on file with

author). A non-printable offense is an offense that is not defined by the Penal Law and for
which fingerprints are not authorized. These offenses include misdemeanors and traffic
infractions, and may or may not be criminal. The DCJS does not track these arrests, and
those arrested will not have criminal records associated with their fingerprints. While some
people are given summonses for these offenses, others are subjected to summary arrest.
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unlicensed general vending,6 6 open containers,67 Transit Authority offenses
(failure to pay fare, disorderly conduct, misuse of transit system),68 and
aggressive solicitation.69 To get beyond and behind these large numbers, I
looked at daily arrest patterns and then at specific arrest charges for
particular days.
By examining how many misdemeanor arrests were made on each day
during this period, a pattern emerged. In all six years, the fewest arrests
were made on Sundays, followed closely by Saturdays and then Fridays; in
each of these years, the most arrests were made on Wednesdays. v° In 2003,
for instance, the average number of people arrested on Wednesdays for
misdemeanors (679.7) was 221% higher than the average number of
people arrested for misdemeanors on Sundays (306.3). 7' And arrests on
Fridays and Saturdays-days on which one might logically expect to see
more arrests because of the increase in alcohol consumption on
weekends-were actually significantly lower than on peak weekdays. v2
Chart 1 demonstrates this weekly arrest pattern. v3
The differences in the numbers of misdemeanor arrests can be
attributed to decisions made regarding the deployment of police
resources. 74 In order to arrest people for minor offenses, teams of officers
are organized to observe people buying drugs, to do sweeps of particular
buildings, or to watch for people jumping turnstiles. "Busy arrest days,"
therefore, are the result of aggressive order-maintenance policing targeted
66. Id. (reporting approximately 5000 arrests per year for violations of NEW YORK
CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-453 (2007)). Those arrested for this offense commonly sell
watches, scarves, umbrellas, socks, and t-shirts without a vending license. However, there
has been a cap on general vending licenses since 1983 (only 853 exist), and there is a waiting
See Local 169V & Urban Justice Ctr., Street Vendors Unite!
list of thousands.
Recommendations for Improving the Regulations on Street Vending in New York City 1
(April 2003), http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/VendorsUnite.pdf.
67. Id. (reporting approximately 5000 arrests per year for violations of NEW YORK
CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-125 (2007)).
68. Id. (reporting approximately 2000 arrests per year for violations of 21 N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. § 1050.6 (2009)).
69. Id. (reporting 500-700 arrests per year for violations of NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE §

70. N.Y.

10-136 (2007)).

STATE Div. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., STATISTICS ON NEW YORK CITY

MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS, 2000-2003 (2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter DCJS Arrest
Statistics for 2000-2003]; N.Y. STATE Div. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., STATISTICS ON
NEW YORK CITY MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS, 2004-2005 (2006) (on file with author)

[hereinafter DCJS Arrest Statistics for 2004-2005].
71. DCJS ARREST STATISTICS FOR 2000-2003, supra note 70.
72. In 2003, average misdemeanor arrests for Fridays and Saturdays were, respectively,
537.3 and 404.7. Id.
73. DCJS ARREST STATISTICS FOR 2000-2003, supra note 70; DCJS ARREST STATISTICS
FOR 2004-2005, supra note 70.
74. A FOIL request to the NYPD for information about police staffing by day-of-week
was denied because the statistics "could not be found." Letter from NYPD Foil Unit, dated
March 22, 2005 (on file with author).
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Chart I
Average Misdemeanor Arrests By Day of the Week
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at particular locations. Other days are "slow arrest days" because of less
aggressive policing of these offenses. By comparing slow arrest days to
busy arrest days, we can generate an estimate of the number of arrests that
are due to aggressive order-maintenance policing.
The arrest numbers for Sundays provide a possible baseline for
misdemeanor policing. While the NYPD maintains a responsive capacity
coupled with some policing of low-level victimless crimes on Sundays, they
do not make large numbers of arrests for low-level offenses.7" If, in the six
years from 2000 through 2005, the NYPD had policed every day as they
did on Sundays, there would have been approximately 340,000 fewer
misdemeanor arrests.
These numbers and weekly patterns demonstrate that continuous and
inflexible engagement in ZTP is not pursued in New York City. Instead,
every week there are days when ZTP is practiced, and other days when it is
not. Further, after September 11, 2001, there was a significant decline of
about thirty-thousand misdemeanor arrests (15%) for about three years
and no contemporaneous increase in serious crime.76 Thus, looking at
75. I infer an adequacy of responsive capacity from the following: first, the NYPD
planners would presumably aim for adequate responsive capacity; second, the city as
viewed from inside the criminal courts or on the streets shows no noticeable rise in disorder
or failure to police on Sundays; and third, since a number of nonviolent low-level arrests
are made, we can assume that police response resources are not stretched beyond capacity
to still conduct some order-maintenance policing.
76. When referring to the decline in crime, this article refers to the decline in FBI
Uniform Crime Reports Index Crimes. See FBI, About the UCR, supranote 5.
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these patterns helps to identify arrests that are the result of ZTP and
suggests that inflexible arrest approaches are not absolutely necessary.
Examining slower arrest days and comparing them to the high arrest days
of midweek can provide clues about which arrests are potentially
expendable. Who are the "extra" people being arrested on busy days?
What offenses are they alleged to have committed?
C. Comparison of Slow Arrest Days to Busy ArrestDays
To answer these questions, I examine the specific misdemeanor arrests
made on slow and busy arrest days. For purposes of comparison I also
include days at the median. To avoid extreme cases, I eliminate the ten
slowest days-typically caused by holidays and disasters-and, for the sake
of balance, the ten busiest days-though I suspect that these are not the
result of increased unlawfulness, but simply greater allocation of resources.
The specific slow, median, and busy days that will be examined, together
with the number of misdemeanor arrests made on each day, appear in
Table 2 below.7 7

Slow 1
Slow 2
Slow 3
Median]
Median2
Median3
High 1
High 2
High 3

TABLE 2. SLOW/MEDIAN/HIGH ARREST DAYS78
2000 Arr. 2001 Arr. 2002 Arr. 2003 Arr. 2004 Arr. 2005

Arr.

10/1
9/3
7/3
12/5
9/22
6/12
3/14
3/15
3/22

257
257
264
548
554
556
765
771
785

295
309
314
624
627
629
906
908
909

9/30
12/24
12/31
8/24
8/3
12/28
6/20
2/27
5/9

143
143
147
559
559
560
803
804
804

1/30
12/16
2/4
1/18
3/29
10/21
3/21
4/17
9/24

249
255
266
501
501
503
801
809
811

9/1
1/26
12/7
6/20
3/28
3/20
1/7
10/22
9/17

219
235
237
513
516
518
809
816
819

6/20
5/9
7/4
9/8
1/16
3/8
3/3
2/25
11/3

240
242
250
523
525
525
780
788
791

5/29
5/30
8/14
10/25
9/16
4/4
4/20
3/2
2/10

A cursory review of these figures shows that the number of
misdemeanor arrests made on busy arrest days is typically about 500 to 600
more arrests per day than for slow days, and between 240 and 300 more
arrests per day than the days that fall at the median. One step toward
examining the wisdom of allocating substantial police resources to
processing hundreds of additional arrests is to identify the nature of the
77. Data on particular arrest days were provided by the DCJS and are on file with the
author. See supranote 70.
78. The median dates are the dates with the 182nd, 183rd, and 184th days respectively.
The 183rd ranked day is the actual median day in the non-leap years. For 2000 and 2004leap years-the same dates are used as, given the even number of days in the year, there is
no actual median. In 2001 there were so few arrests in the days following 9/11 that
Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve were not among the slowest ten arrest days.
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offenses that make up the additional daily arrests.79 Are there more
"serious" misdemeanors committed on these busy days? The answer to
this question depends primarily, of course, on the reader's definition of a
"serious" misdemeanor. Is marijuana possession "serious"? Is gambling,
prostitution, or possession of other drugs for personal use "serious"?
Assuming these acts are serious, how serious?
For the purposes of the following analysis, I have divided the arrests
into three categories that relate to the harm caused by the offense. In the
first category, "Harm to Persons," I include offenses that result in
nonconsensual harm or potential harm to others, including assaults,
menacing, stalking, sex offenses (sexual assaults, not prostitution),
weapons possession, and the like. Also included in this category are
driving while intoxicated and failure to register as a sex offender, as these
offenses are designed to control for potential harm to persons. In the next
category, "Harm to Property," the offenses obviously cause some harm to
owners but do not harm the owner physically. The essence of these
offenses is that they represent either the theft or the destruction of
property. A third category of offenses, "Offenses to Public Order,"
include consensual or victimless crimes and other low-level offenses.8"
While some may argue that some of the crimes are miscategorized," I
suspect that there will be little disagreement that the offenses to public
order are somewhat less serious than the misdemeanor offenses to persons
or property."2
The reader need not agree with my categorization-perhaps she will
consider prostitution as causing harm to persons, 3 or petit larceny
79. An arrest typically takes an officer off the street for hours. For a good description
of the entire arrest process from the police perspective, see EDWARD CONLON, BLUE
BLOOD 14-16 (2004).
80. See Appendix for tables indicating number of arrests by offense. Once again, the
non-printable offenses are not included in this particular data set.
81. Indeed, the categorization reflects some ambiguous calls on the part of the author.
Is graffiti more properly categorized as harm to property or harm to order? Because the
offense most often results in only temporary alteration to often abandoned or unused
properties and does not compromise the utility of, for example, a wall, a steel gate, or even
a subway car, the offense seems more properly one of public order.
82. Of course there are bound to be baseless charges in any and all of these categories.
With the exception of obstruction of administration of justice and resisting arrest, the
division into categories of seriousness or lesser seriousness assumes that the arrests for any
given offense are consistent with the elements as described in the New York Penal Law.
For the offenses of obstruction and resisting arrest, the author's experience (eight years in
the Criminal Court) suggests that they be placed in the harms to order category, as the
former most commonly involves a person questioning police conduct without interfering in
any way, and the latter involves waving one's arms (if injury results, the charge will
invariably be raised to a felony assault)83. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization,73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 523, 533 (2000) (discussing criminalization of exchanging sex for money as actually a
significant cause of violent crime against prostitutes by police, pimps, johns, and others).
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(shoplifting) to be less serious than some offenses to public order. The
importance of the exercise lies in recognizing that, within the general
category of misdemeanors, there are significant discrepancies in the gravity
of the offenses. Despite these differences, those arrested for these offenses
are treated in a way that is largely indistinguishable from felony arrestees.8
As discussed below, the consequences of arrest and conviction for minor
offenses have not been fully studied but have significant potential to
adversely affect those arrested, their families, their communities, and the
criminal justice system. Disaggregating and studying misdemeanor arrests
is an exercise that should be undertaken if our policing strategy results in
hundreds of thousands of minor arrests in a handful of years. Crucial
questions to consider are whether particular offenses belong in the
criminal justice system; and, if so, whether these offenses should be policed
via summary arrest.
These statistics show that the least serious offenses make up the lion's
share of the additional arrests on busy days. 5 This is true of the additional
arrests made from slow to median days (approximately 300 per day), as
well as the difference between slow and busy days (approximately 600 per
day). Chart 2 shows the breakdown by offense of the "extra" arrests made
on busy days as opposed to slow days. 6 Over 80% of these additional
arrests were offenses to order.Thus of the approximately 600 additional
arrests on a busy arrest day in any given year, on average nearly 200 are
for marijuana possession, 120 for misdemeanor drug possession, 65 for
turnstile jumping (theft of services), 40 for trespass, and 30 for
prostitution-related offenses. Arrests for these offenses drop to the single
figures on slow days and can rise by well over 1000% on busy days.
Of the Harm to Persons and Harm to Property offenses, only two
offenses in the first category and one in the second rise consistently in all
six years as policing intensifies. In the Harm to Persons category, there are
two to five times more arrests for harassment offenses. 7 There are also
typically two to three times more arrests for second degree criminal
contempt" or bail jumping. 9 In the Harm to Property category, petit
larceny9" arrests nearly double from slow to busy arrests days each year.

84. See infra Part III.A. on arrest processing. Of course, sentencing differs
substantially from category to category among misdemeanors and between misdemeanors
and felonies. The arrest process, however, is the same.
85. See infra Chart 2 and Appendix (providing raw numbers).
86. The chart reflects the statistics for all six years (2000-2005). N=approximately 9000.
87. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.25-26 (McKinney 2008).
88. Id § 215.50.
89. Id.§ 215.55.
90. Id. § 155.25.
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It seems likely that in all categories these rises are due to
enforcement choices. It is unlikely that the number of shoplifters,
amount of harassment, number of marijuana sales, or people who
choose to ignore court orders (most often orders of protection), leading
to contempt of court charges, rises coincidentally on these "busy"
Wednesdays and Thursdays. There is not more crime; it is simply that it
Chart2
Breakdown of Offenses for Extra Arrests onBusy Policuig Days (2000-05)
Other
Harm
to Public
Order
Oferes

7 %

Marijuana
30%

Harm to Property or
PropertyOffenses
600

Harm or Potential
Harm to Other Pers ons
11%

Pro stituion
5%

T heftof Services
12%

20%

is policed differently.
Police go out looking for offenses, more
specifically for arrests under the ZTP model of policing. 91 On days
when more police officers are on regular duty, discretion will more
likely be exercised in favor of arresting shoplifters. Police may follow
up on complaints for contempt of court or harassment. 92 Warrant
squads will look for those who missed court appearances and can be
charged with bail jumping.
Police teams will set out to make
undercover buys or observations of marijuana sellers. Similarly, they
will target spots where other controlled substances are purchased,
resulting in the hundreds of non-marijuana drug arrests. Vehicle check
points, and placing officers in "trespass buildings" to look for and
search people who appear out of place, result in additional arrests for
driving with a suspended license, trespassing, or possession of a
controlled substance.

91. BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 14, at 229.
92. Harassment offenses often involve annoying phone calls and therefore require the
police to seek out the accused based on a complaint.
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With the exception of misdemeanor assault,93 which involves no
weapon and no serious injury, the more serious misdemeanors-sex
offenses, unlawful imprisonment, unauthorized use of an automobile and
autostripping, endangering the welfare of a child, and driving while under
the influence-show little or no correlation with increased misdemeanor
policing. This is not an argument either for or against ZTP. In fact, this is
what one would expect, because presumably these more serious offenses
are policed even on slow days, though follow-ups on complaints and the
exercise of discretion in favor of arrests may lead to a few more arrests on
fully staffed days.
D. Weapons Justificationfor Zero Tolerance Policing
One significant justification for ZTP is that arresting people for minor
offenses provides the opportunity to get weapons off the street.94
However, the statistics do not establish a correlation between aggressive
misdemeanor policing and the seizure of felony-grade weapons. Felony
weapons arrests do not rise in tandem with misdemeanor arrests from slow
days to busy days. 95 In the six years studied, felony weapons arrests were
highest on busy arrest days in three years, highest on slow arrest days in
two years, and highest on median days in one year. This distribution
suggests that aggressive misdemeanor policing is not significantly
contributing to gun seizures.96 This is not to say that the perception that
police are policing aggressively is not a deterrent to those who would carry
weapons, but simply that the practice of making 200,000 misdemeanor
arrests a year is not bringing in significant numbers of weapons.
On the other hand, in five of the six years, misdemeanor weapons
arrests were higher on median days than on slow days, and higher on busy
days than on median days (about ten more misdemeanor weapons arrests
were made per day on busy days). Thus, in the course of arresting over
500 "extra" people on minor offenses, about ten misdemeanor weapons
arrests were made. 97 However, it is important to assess the term "weapon"
in this context and consider what it actually means. First, the weapons
being seized are not loaded guns.9 Under New York law, a "loaded"
firearm would be charged as a misdemeanor only if seized at a home or

93. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2008).
94. BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 14, at 154 (stating that one in twenty-one people
arrested for fare evasion in the initial days of the Transit Authority crackdown on this
offense had a weapon).
95. See Appendix, Felony Weapons Offenses table.
96. This is consistent with studies suggesting that focused problem-solving approaches
are a more effective means of interdicting weapons.
97. See Appendix, Offenses: Harm or Potential Harm to Other Persons table.
98. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01-.03 (McKinney 2008).
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office.9 9 Second, misdemeanor weapons charges are most often the result
of possession of a knife or a box cutter." Third, any prior criminal
conviction can be used to increase the misdemeanor weapons charge to a
felony."' Thus, only a person with no prior criminal convictions will be
charged with misdemeanor weapons possession. As often as not, these
additional arrestees will be entirely law-abiding individuals who carry a
knife or box cutter for work or protection.
Despite the weapons-based justification for ZTP, it appears that high
arrest numbers do not lead to large numbers of gun arrests.
E. RacialImpact of Zero TolerancePolicing
A final issue that the statistics highlight is the demographics of
misdemeanor policing. The communities from which defendants most
often come are disproportionately affected by the aggressive misdemeanor
policy. The data indicate that about 86% of people arrested for
misdemeanors in New York City in the years 2000-2005 were nonwhite."' 2
About 48-50% were reported to be black and another 32-34% Hispanic.
The 2001 census estimates that blacks and Latinos make up 27.09% and
27.80% of New Yorkers, respectively.1" 3 While race is only a rough proxy
for community 0 4 and there is no assurance that those arrested are even
from New York City, it seems reasonable to assume that the hundreds of
thousands of arrests made during the past six years under an aggressive
misdemeanor policing strategy have had a disproportionate impact on
communities of color in New York City. Furthermore, many of the
aggressive arrest approaches do have a geographic locus that affects those

99. Id. §§ 265.01-.03.
100. Id §§ 265.01-03. Also included are fake, nonfunctional, and unloaded guns;
nunchaku; kung-fu stars; brass knuckles; etc. See Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of
Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1167 (2004) (noting that
the police could easily arrest all construction workers and charge them with weapons
possession because of the utility knives on their belts).
101. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 2008).
102. New York City MisdemeanorArrests by Race-Ethnicity,Div. of Criminal Justice
Servs. (provided for 2000-05) (on file with author).
103. U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2001 Supplementary Survey
Profile for New York City, Table 1, http://www.census.gov/acs/www[Products/Profiles/Single/
2001/SSO1/Tabular/160/16000US36510001.htm.
These percentages reflect people who
reported that they were Hispanic, Latino, black, or of mixed heritage in the 2000 U.S. census.
104. It is my belief that the proxy is not as rough as it may seem. As mentioned above,
the additional arrests on high arrest days are the result of concerted police action. Thus,
teams will plan to put up vehicle check-points, do "vertical sweeps" in which they stop
everyone in particular buildings, set up observation points to look for drugs, or stand
beyond turnstiles to catch those who jump them. It is only natural that these efforts are
focused on particular spots and in particular neighborhoods. Police officers waiting by a
turnstile at Wall Street may achieve fewer turnstile jumper arrests than those waiting by a
turnstile in a poorer area of the city.
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residing in or passing through disadvantaged and largely minority
communities." °5
As discussed in the next section, this impact resolves itself into very
real economic losses in terms of lost earnings and surcharges. The longterm impact related to decreased employment opportunities, bars to public
housing, and adverse credit ratings due to misdemeanor and violation
arrests and convictions require long-term study but are likely to be
substantial. Further, the impact is likely to be compounded by race.
Finally, the perception of unfairness created by the racial discrepancy and
the treatment received within the system may lead to procedural justice
costs that decrease willingness to comply with the law.
III.
THE COSTS OF AGGRESSIVE ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING

Aggressive misdemeanor policing in New York City has a number of
hidden costs. Many of these costs are externalized, born by individual
arrestees, their families, their communities, and the larger community of
taxpayers to the extent that arrests and criminal records lead to further
arrests, incarceration, or un(der)employment.
Other costs are borne
directly by the system. The NYPD, District Attorney's offices, courts, and
defenders' offices1" 6 all dedicate significant resources to moving papers and
people for thousands of minor offenses. The costs are greater than the
dollar amounts or loss of time for other matters. The very fabric of the
criminal justice system suffers under the pressure to process the large
number of people charged with misdemeanors and lesser offenses that
flood the system. In this section, I will examine the costs, both direct and
indirect, of ZTP policies. Although such costs will vary from system to
system, identifying the many points at which costs could be minimized in
the New York City system should prove instructive in reviewing any other
system. I begin with costs to the defendant that arise directly from the
arrest through disposition of a case. I will then explore common collateral
consequences for the individual. Finally, I will outline costs to the
community, the police, and the court system.

105. For a discussion of why police and prosecutorial resources focus on poor
neighborhoods, thereby creating a disparate racial impact, see William J. Stuntz, Race,
Class,andDrugs,98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1821-24 (1998).
106. New York City does not have a single public defender office. Rather, the city
relies on contracts with various private defender offices to provide defense services to the
indigent.
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A. The Process
1. The ArraignmentExperience..7
In New York City, the process from arrest to the first appearance
before a judge in court is the same for misdemeanor and felony charges.
Regardless of the level of arrest offense, New York City permits twentyfour hours of detention prior to arraignment"'8 and, for the most part, the
process takes this amount of time.1" 9 Nor is it unusual for particular
individuals to spend significantly more than twenty-four hours detained
prior to arraignment.1 0 What is rare is for a person to be arraigned
within less than fifteen hours of her arrest. Those charged with
misdemeanors or lesser offenses are searched or strip-searched' and
held in the same cells at precinct houses with alleged felons. They are
then transported to central booking, where they are photographed,
fingerprinted, and booked. At central booking and the arraignment
courtrooms, those accused of felonies, misdemeanors, and even
violations are held in large cells together." 2 These holding cells are lined
with benches along the walls and have a single doorless toilet; there are

107. The description of the conditions of pre-arraignment detention and treatment are
based on the author's own observations as a defense attorney for eight years in Manhattan
Criminal Court.
108. See People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 223, 225 (N.Y. 1991)
(interpreting the "unnecessary delay" requirement of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20(1) to
entitle a person to release after twenty-four hours without arraignment unless an
acceptable reason for the delay is given, and creating a presumption that a delay greater
than twenty-four hours is unnecessary).
109. The average arrest to arraignment time in 2007 in New York City Courts was
24.07 hours. JUANITA BING NEWTON & WILLIAM H. ETHERIDGE III, CRIMINAL COURT OF
THE CITY OF N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 23 (Justin Barry ed., 2008) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL
COURT
ANNUAL
REPORT
2007],
available
at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/criminal/ (follow "2007" hyperlink under "NY City
Criminal Court Annual Reports").
110. New York City Bill of Rights Defense Campaign, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union,
Arrest
to
Arraignment
in
New
York
City:
Oct.-Nov.
2004,
http://www.nycbordc.org/docs/nyc-arrest-to-arraignment.pdf. In the two-month period of
October and November of 2004, 16,341 defendants (40% of those arrested) were held more
than twenty-four hours. Id at 5. Misdemeanants made up 9396 of these detainees. Id at 4.
111. Benjamin Weiser, New York Will Pay $50 Million In 50,000 Illegal StripSearches, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at Al. Although the NYPD Patrol Guide indicates
that only those suspected of concealing a weapon or contraband should be strip-searched,
the Civilian Complaint Review Board found that police were sometimes unaware of the
proper procedures. N.Y. CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BOARD, STATUS REPORT, at i, 3
(Jan.-June 2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/ccrbsemi2004.pdf.
112. Women, juveniles, those with infectious diseases, and transvestites are generally
separated from men. Facilities for these groups are usually less functional than the areas
reserved for men, lacking even a bathroom, forcing the individuals to beg police officers to
take them to the bathroom.
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no beds and no washrooms.1 13 No one has the opportunity to brush their
teeth or shower, and it is the rare individual who manages to sleep in the
mayhem of these holding cells. During the hours in this cell, arrestees
are given either cheese or bologna on white bread or Special K in a small
box with milk, depending on the time of day or night. Roaches crawl
over the remains of these meals,"' and the floors are either sticky or
newly mopped with industrial strength cleaner which burns the eyes. The
Appellate Division has characterized conditions of pre-arraignment
detention as "notoriously harsh," "chronically overcrowded and
'
squalid."115
The process is nearly as inadequate as the facilities." 6 Attorneys meet
with clients in booths attached to the main cells. The defendants are located
by yelling an arrestee's name into each cell until someone responds.
Attorney and client sit (when the chairs are not broken) separated by heavy
caging to review the charge or charges. The defense attorney is expected to
be able to handle at least twenty misdemeanor or violation complaints in a

shift." 7 In an eight-hour shift with the court closing down for a ninety
minute lunch break, the attorney has 19.5 minutes per case. 18 These
minutes are not all dedicated to explaining the clients' rights, but include
time to (1) review the case file; (2) meet and interview the client; (3) advise
the client on likely outcomes and on what challenging the charges, pleading
guilty, or accepting an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD)
113. While the description of the conditions is based on the author's own observations,
the arraignment experience is also described in Randy Schain, Op-Ed., Doing Major Time
fora Minor Crime,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at A23.
114. Martha Rayner, Conference Report.-New York City's Criminal Courts. Are We
Achieving Justice9 , 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1035, 1045 (2004) (describing the
dehumanizing conditions, including vermin, in New York City Criminal Courts).
115. People exrel Maxian v. Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
116. It has long been accepted that, for misdemeanors, "the process is the
punishment." In his aptly named description of the New Haven Criminal Court first
published in 1979, Malcolm Feeley described a system in which an accused would gladly
waive all rights (even after hours in jail) because the cost of asserting rights far outweighed
the potential punishment. FEELEY, supranote 11, at 277.
117. Rayner, supra note 114, at 1054 ("[T]he sheer number of cases required
professionals to value speed and efficiency over individualized justice.").
118. In fact, defendants are usually brought to the arraignment pens in bunches, and
there is considerable pressure on defense attorneys to interview the defendants as quickly as
possible and then to make themselves available by sitting in court prepared to run through a
number of dispositions in a row. Thus, rather than nineteen minutes, an attorney is likely to
interview five to ten defendants in an hour, giving more time to the defendants with the
charges that involve offenses against others or property, and often spending no more than
three minutes telling a defendant who is there on a first arrest for a minor offense that he or
she will be out shortly, will have to stay out of trouble, and may have to do community
service. In many jurisdictions no counsel is provided to indigent defendants in misdemeanor
cases at all. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 26 (2004),
availableat http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.
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would involve; (4) make phone calls related to bail; (5) speak with family
members in the court room; (6) discuss potential disposition with the
Assistant District Attorney; and (7) actually stand up in front of the court on
the case. Competent client-centered representation, particularly in light of
the increasing consequences of noncriminal dispositions, cannot take place
in such a short time." 9 In reality, however, many attorneys give clients
charged with minor offenses even shorter shrift. For everyone in the
courthouse-with the exception of the defendant-an arraignment is so
routine that there is little to talk about, and the sooner a defendant appears
before the judge the sooner that defendant will be able to get out and go
home. The typical offer for a first arrest of the type that rise exponentially
on busy arrest days (marijuana possession, misdemeanor drug possession,
turnstile jumping, or petit larceny) is some variation on a noncriminal
disposition with or without a day of community service or a "treatment"
program. 2 ' For a defendant with a nonviolent record who is not on parole
or probation, the likely result is a plea to the charged offense for time
121
already served in jail plus community service or a sentence of a few days.
Over 60% of misdemeanor and lesser offense arrests are resolved by plea,
dismissal, or ACD 122 at the arraignment appearance in criminal court.'23 For
those whose cases are not resolved, about 80% 1are
released on their own
24
recognizance, and the remainder are held on bail.
119. Steven Zeidman, Perspective: Time to End Violation Pleas, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1,
2008, at 2.
120. These dispositions are based primarily on observations in Manhattan
arraignments and may very from borough to borough.
121. See Solomon, supra note 47, at 6 (noting that the median jail sentence for a person
convicted of a misdemeanor in 1998 was seven days, including pretrial detention time).
122. An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ("ACD") results in the automatic
dismissal of all charges six months (or one year for a family offense) after the arraignment unless
the prosecutor makes a motion to restore the case to the calendar before the expiration of that
time. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(1)-(2) (McKinney 2008). An ACD pursuant to N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 requires the consent of all parties. Id Section 170.56 permits a judge
to give an ACD with a one-year dismissal date for the first marijuana arrest without the consent
of the prosecutor. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.56(1)-(2) (governing ACDs for violations
of the provisions of the penal code relating to marijuana). Often, the prosecutor will offer an
ACD with community service, a short treatment program, or a "Stoplift" Program (a daylong
educational program for first offender shoplifters that typically costs about $100). A "straight"
ACD is one that does not require any further action on the part of the defendant.
123. See N.Y. CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2006 (2007),
available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/annua06.pdf (noting that 45% of A
misdemeanor cases in Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, and Staten Island and 49% in Bronx
were disposed of at arraignment; 67% of other misdemeanor offenses citywide were
disposed of at arraignment; and 92% of less severe offenses citywide, excluding the Bronx,
and 75% in the Bronx were disposed of at arraignments). A total of 160,228 cases were
disposed of at arraignments-3% of felony cases, 45% of A misdemeanors, 67% of B
misdemeanors, and 92% of lesser offenses. Idat 18.
124. See id. at 18 (reporting that defendants in 70% of continued A misdemeanor
cases, 85% of other misdemeanors, and 88% of lesser offenses were released on their own
recognizance).
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2. Dispositions
For those who accept a disposition short of a "straight" ACD or
dismissal, the costs of a single day of community service, or a sentence of
time served on a disorderly conduct plea (the typical noncriminal
alternative) is far higher than they might at first suspect. The completion
of a single day of community service will generally demand significant
portions of three different days (two of which will be weekdays).'2 5 First,
the defendant must return to sign up for community service (if she is
arraigned on a weekday morning, she may be able to accomplish this
before leaving the courthouse if she is stalwart enough not to run directly
for fresh air and a toothbrush). This must be done on a weekday morning.
Second, the defendant must complete the community service. A request to
perform the community service on a particular day of the week (including
Saturday or Sunday) can be accommodated. Finally, the defendant needs
to return to court to prove that she completed the community service (also
on a weekday). Thus, between the twenty-four hours between arrest and
release (usually resulting in at least one missed day of work), signing up for
community service, completing it, and appearing at 9:30 a.m. in a court to
prove that completion, an arrestee will typically miss between two and four
days of work or school. For some employed individuals, particularly those
in low-skill or service sector jobs, such absences can mean the loss of a job.
In many more cases they mean the loss of income. For those with
childcare responsibilities, these demands can lead to makeshift and
suboptimal solutions affecting extended families.
The subway fares
required to keep these appointments alone can represent a significant
expense to a person of limited means.
3. MandatorySurcharge and Crime Victims 'Assistance Fee
When a person pleads guilty to a misdemeanor or violation under the
Penal Law, a mandatory surcharge and Crime Victims' Assistance Fee are
imposed.12 6 The surcharge for a misdemeanor is $175, and it is $95 for a
violation." 7 The Crime Victims' Assistance Fee is $25 for all convictions.12 s
For those with the means to pay this surcharge, an additional trip to the
courthouse during business hours is required to pay these fees. But for
many defendants, payment of $200 for a misdemeanor or $120 for a
violation deprives them of money that might otherwise be spent on food,
clothing, school supplies, housing expenses, and other necessities.
Certainly, the hardships represented by these fixed mandatory fees are
125.
126.
127.
128.

Description of this process is based on the author's observation in criminal court.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.35(1) (McKinney 2008).
Id. § 60.35(1)(b)-(c).
Id. § 60.35(1)(a)-(c).
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regressive: they are felt most by the needy, and are little more than an
inconvenience to the rare wealthy or middle-class defendant. For those
without the resources, some judges will enter civil judgment at the time of
the plea and others will require the defendant to appear to pay the fee or
plead poverty in court sixty days after the conviction. At this court
appearance, a civil judgment will generally be entered against the
impoverished defendant.1 29 In addition to the multiple trips to the
courthouse, the long-term effects of civil judgments are significant and
seldom if ever explained to a defendant. Once a judgment is entered, a
person may not be able to obtain loans to buy a car, to go to school, or to
buy a house. 3 °
Without schooling or private transportation, job
opportunities are limited in a way that is not intended by any of the
individuals standing in criminal court or the police officer exercising
discretion in favor of making a misdemeanor arrest. Job opportunities are
further limited because many employers also look at credit reports that
may reflect this civil judgment or arrest."'
4. Court Appearances
A decision not to accept a disposition at arraignment leads to a
number of court appearances which impose a considerable burden on the
accused and a lesser burden on the criminal justice system. 13 2 These court
appearances are generally between two and four weeks apart for nonincarcerated clients. Typical purposes of these appearances are for
supporting depositions"' and/or laboratory reports,"' motion practice,"'
129. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 420.40(5) (McKinney 2008) (making applicable to
mandatory surcharges and crime victim assistance fees the legal provisions governing
collection of fines). It appears that civil judgments are entered in the vast majority of cases.
The revenues from surcharges suggest that only a fraction of the 144,000 people convicted

in Criminal Court in 2007 paid the mandatory surcharges. See CRIMINAL COURT

ANNUAL

2007, supra note 109, at 16, 62 (reporting on number of citywide guilty pleas and
convictions and revenues from surcharges).
130. Once the judgment is paid the credit record may be marred by the fact that a
judgment was entered for years.
REPORT

131. NYSBA RE-ENTRY REPORT, supra note 6, at 177.
132. The mean age at disposition (by dismissal or plea-trial cases take longer) of a case

surviving arraignments in 2007 was 100 days.

CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT

2007, supra

note 109, at 40, 41. Since court appearances are generally two to four weeks apart for nonincarcerated defendants, the mean age at disposition represents three to six appearances.
133. A supporting deposition is simply a sworn verified statement, typically made by a
complainant in a misdemeanor case, that the allegations in the complaint filed at
arraignment are true. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.20 (McKinney 2008).
134. Laboratory reports or field tests may be required to satisfy pleading requirements
that require facts of "evidentiary character" to support the charge. See id. § 100.15(3)
(establishing pleading requirement for misdemeanor and felony complaints of factual
allegations "of an evidentiary character" supporting or tending to support the charges).
135. Typically, defense motions may include motions to dismiss charges that are not
supported by the allegations in the complaint and motions to suppress evidence that flows
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suppression hearings, and trial dates.13 6 Defendants are told to appear in
misdemeanor parts 3 7 at 9:30 a.m. and wait there for defense counsel,
prosecutor, and judge to be ready and for all the cases that are signed up
ahead of their case to be called. 138 In addition, jailed defendants' cases will
often be completed before non-incarcerated defendants to facilitate the
functioning of corrections. Thus, a defendant who appears in court at or
before 9:30 a.m. will frequently not have her case called for hours.139 It is
not uncommon for misdemeanor courts with heavy calendars to be
running at 6:00 p.m.; defense attorneys from large offices can ask
colleagues to "cover" their cases, and often an attorney who is there and
has a case signed up by 9:20 a.m. will be able to get her clients out of the
courtroom by 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. For attorneys with cases in different
courtrooms, asking another attorney to cover is the only way to assure that
a client who arrives early is not still in the courthouse in the afternoon or
early evening. The trade-off, of course, is that a defendant may show up
for court again and again and never see her attorney. For attorneys who
do appear, hours are spent simply waiting for a case to be called. For
appointed counsel (most often solo practitioners), this means hours of
billable time that the city must pay.
When the court calls a case, it can appear from a defendant's
perspective that nothing happens. Papers are exchanged (an affidavit or
motions), adjournments are requested (for filing an affidavit or a motion),
or a suppression hearing or trial is adjourned because defense counsel,
from violations of constitutional rights. They may be accompanied by a demand for a bill
of particulars and discovery requests. Prosecutors respond to these motions and the judges
decide the motions. At its most efficient, the defendant appears once: defense motions are
filed on a non-court date, the prosecutor responds, and the judge issues a decision on the
date the defendant appears. More often, the defense attorney, prosecutor, or judge
requires more time to file or decide motions, and the defendant makes multiple
appearances during this process.
136. In New York, as opposed to many jurisdictions, neither the defense nor the court
will be told whether the prosecutor is ready for trial until the court appearance. The result
is that the defendant and defense counsel often make multiple appearances for "trial" and
are sent away with another court date.
137. The term "part" is synonymous with "courtroom" and will be used
interchangeably throughout this discussion.
138. Generally a single judge and one or two prosecutors will be in a part for the entire
day handling all cases. Defense counsel frequently have cases in multiple parts all
scheduled for 9:30 a.m., and defendants often wait for their attorneys. Prosecutors,
however, will frequently ask for a "second call" to determine whether they are ready for
hearings or to get supporting depositions and lab reports, thus requiring the defendant to
return and repeat the process another day.
139. In most New York misdemeanor courtrooms, the list of defendants on the
calendar is not read in the morning, so the court does not know if a defendant is present at
9:30 a.m., and a defendant may be unsure whether she is in the right place. It is not
uncommon for a defendant to sit for hours in the courtroom and nonetheless have a
warrant issued based on her absence when she has gone out momentarily to use a phone or
a bathroom.
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prosecutor, or witnesses are otherwise engaged or for lack of available

court parts. 14° In the rare instance when a hearing does take place, 4' the

parties are generally sent to a Judicial Hearing Officer, another wait

begins, and at the end of a long day an advisory opinion based on the
hearing is issued. Because this must be reviewed by a criminal court judge,
another adjournment ensues whether or not the attorneys choose to put
arguments in writing after the hearing. At the following appearance, a
decision is issued and then the case is adjourned for trial. Misdemeanor
trials almost never occur for offenses to public order; the tens of thousands
of turnstile jumping and marijuana possession cases that go through the
system every year do not result in any adjudicative process. 42 Only a small
fraction of 1% (0.2%) of misdemeanor and violation cases are ever tried in
New York City.143

The consequences of this for the legitimacy of the

criminal justice system are discussed below.

140. Because there are so many misdemeanor cases and relatively few misdemeanor
judges, there is a lack of trial and hearing courts for misdemeanor cases. To address this
problem, the former Chief Judge of New York has created an experimental program in the
Bronx to increase hearing and trial capacity for misdemeanors by combining felony and
misdemeanor courts into a single Criminal Division. See James C. McKinley Jr., Bronx
Courts to Merge in PilotProjectto Trim Backlogs,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004, at B4 ("[The]
pilot project [is] meant to respond to a steep drop in felonies and a surge in misdemeanors

over the past decade.");

JUDITH

S. KAYE,

THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY

2005, at 8 (2005),

available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/admin/stateofjudiciary/soj2005.pdf (confirming
former Chief Judge Kaye's motivation in establishing this merger).
141. Less than 1000 hearings have been conducted in misdemeanor or violation cases
in any year since 2000. CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supranote 109, at 56.
142. Of 220,000 arrests in New York City in 2000, only 412 were tried. N.Y. State Div.
of Criminal Justice Servs., New York City Misdemeanor Arrests and Trial Statistics for
2000-2003 (2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter DCJS Trial Statistics]. Of these, 299
were for harm to people, 31 for harm to property, and 77 for offenses which I included in
the category of harm to order. Id. Six marijuana possession cases were tried (with three
acquittals) despite tens of thousands of arrests for this offense. Id. Those who seek to
challenge arrests for victimless crimes often get a speedy trial dismissal after months of
appearing in court. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2008) (providing time
limits on charges when the state is not ready to proceed with trial). In one turnstile
jumping case, my client insisted from the start that he was not guilty and appeared time
after time in court waiting to tell his story. When we arrived at the trial part, the prosecutor
came in and moved to dismiss the case, stating that the police officer had no recollection of
the arrest. The defendant never got to tell his story, the police officer's credibility was
never tested, and the defendant "won" his case without ever getting justice.
143. DCJS Trial Statistics, supra note 142.
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4 of Minor Offenses
B. CollateralConsequencesw

The collateral consequences of a misdemeanor or even a violation
conviction can be substantial and are often inadequately explained to a
defendant.145 They are also overlooked by most of the actors in the system
and, if considered, may well violate our basic notions of proportionality.1 46
Presumably when a defendant is asked to do a day of community service or
is given a sentence of "time served" after a night in jail, there is no intention
to ruin her life-to bar her from employment, loans, home, or family.'47
Further, the impact of an arrest alone (whether followed by conviction or
not) has collateral consequences that have not been studied or quantified
but that clearly should be considered in deciding whether the benefits of
aggressive misdemeanor policing are worth the costs. A careful review of
the costs also suggests a number of ways in which such costs can be reduced
or even eliminated, which will be explored in the final section of this paper.
1. Individual CollateralLegal Consequences
The list of consequences associated with even a misdemeanor or
violation conviction can include deportation, housing and employment
penalties, ineligibility for public assistance and food stamps, future
sentencing, parole or probation revocation and incarceration, driver's
license suspension and, as mentioned above, civil judgments.'4 8
a) Immigration
For immigration purposes a single misdemeanor conviction can result
in deportation, even for a legal permanent resident.'
Drug convictions
144. I use this term broadly to include both legally mandated and legally permitted
collateral consequences (such as deportation, exclusion from public housing, parole
violations, and suspension from work for certain employers), as well as the consequences
that flow from arrest or conviction that are not the result of legislative decisions (such as
loss of income, reduction of employment opportunities, and impact on attitudes of different
parties about the criminal justice system).
145. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral
ConsequencesandReentryinto CriminalDefense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067,
1077-81 (2004) (noting that judges and prosecutors are similarly unaware of collateral
consequences and that judges and defense attorneys have no duty to ensure the defendant
is aware of these consequences).
146. Robert M.A. Johnson, CollateralConsequences,CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 32, 33.
147. Id. (describing a prosecutor's struggle to do justice in a case where a conviction
would result in the defendant's deportation despite the district attorney's belief that the
defendant should not be separated from his family).
148. The lifetime ban for receipt of public assistance and food stamps applies only to
felony drug convictions and therefore is not discussed. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2006).
149. Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated
Approach to Understandingthe Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings,43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 340 (2008).
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fall into this category 5 ° Two convictions for offenses that demonstrate
"moral turpitude" (such as jumping a turnstile or petit larceny) can have
the same result. 51 It is easy to imagine the victims of such fates as foreign,
undocumented, non-English speaking, or marginal, but there is little to
prevent a parent who has lived and worked here lawfully for decades from
being deported. 52 Such defendants are often entirely uninformed of
deportation consequences because the defense attorneys fail to recognize
their clients' immigration status. For individuals who are more obviously
immigrants, some defense attorneys do not consider it a part of their job to
advise clients about immigration issues."5 3 Even if an attorney does ask
about immigration status in the few minutes allowed for a client interview,
a client may choose not to reveal such information to a stranger. Many
attorneys continue to believe that the likelihood of deportation for a
misdemeanor is so remote that it is unnecessary to explain the possibility.
Finally, there are defense attorneys who, regrettably, are still entirely
unaware of the potential consequence of a guilty plea to a seemingly
insignificant misdemeanor.'
Suffice it to say, it is not uncommon for
misdemeanors to result in deportation of defendants who remember no
other home but the United States and have always maintained a legal
immigration status. For those on the road to legal status, even noncriminal
convictions (such as the ubiquitous "disorderly conduct") can lead to
adverse immigration consequences because the underlying records are
available to immigration authorities. Because deportation is civil and
collateral to the offense at hand, the defense counsel has no enforceable
duty in many jurisdictions to advise defendants of immigration
consequences,155 and the non-citizen in immigration removal proceedings
has no right to counsel. 56
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).

151. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
152. "In the year ending in June, as part of a new federal project, more than 1,800
foreign-born New Yorkers who had completed short terms at Rikers [Island] were turned
over to immigration authorities for deportation, officials said. Many . . . were legal
residents who had pleaded guilty to misdemeanors, unaware that they were making
themselves deportable, or that the government could send them to wait in jail cells far from
family, friends and legal help." Nina Bernstein, When a MetroCardLed FarOut of Town,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at B1.
153. For a discussion of the narrow focus on criminal consequences of some defense
attorneys, see Michael Pinard, An IntegratedPerspective on the CollateralConsequences
of CriminalConvictions andReentry Issues Facedby FormerlyIncarceratedIndividuals,86
B.U. L. REV. 623,674-76 (2006).
154. Pinard, supra note 145, at 1080.
155. United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7 (4th Cir. 1988); Flo Messier, Alien
Defendants in CriminalProceedings:Justice Shrugs, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1416-19
(1999) (discussing different approaches to defense attorney's duty to advise defendant of
immigration consequences).
156. Markowitz, supra note 149, at 341 (arguing that the expulsion of legal permanent
aliens should be considered a criminal proceeding).
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The costs of adverse immigration consequences are rarely confined to
the individual deported.
The ripples affect whole families and
communities.157 Even where a family member is not gainfully employed,
often the presence of extended family permits others to work and support
the family without paying for childcare. While a convicted criminal may
properly be removed from a community to deter and protect the
community, this rationale hardly applies to the vast majority of victimless
misdemeanor convictions. The crimes are often unworthy of any jail time
at all, yet detention and deportation can follow.
b) Public Housing
In the case of public housing, entire families may be evicted, become
ineligible for public housing for a period of years, or be forced to bar
members from the household.' 58 The New York City Housing Authority
deems a person ineligible for public housing for four years following the
conviction (and end of sentence) for an A misdemeanor, three years after
a B misdemeanor, and two years after a conviction for a violation under
the penal law.' 59 It is important to note that this period begins at the end
of the sentence. Thus, when a defendant is given a conditional discharge
on an A misdemeanor and told to stay out of trouble for a year, she will
not be eligible for public housing for five years. Even sealed convictions
for violations can serve as the basis for exclusion. 6 A person who is
convicted of a misdemeanor while living in public housing can attempt to
prove that they are rehabilitated, but the burden is on the applicant to
prove such rehabilitation at a hearing. 6 '
c) Incarceration
Though defendants rarely serve significant sentences
for
misdemeanors that do not harm others, misdemeanor arrests and
convictions can lead to significant incarceration in jail and prison because

157. See Nina Bernstein, A Mother Deported,and a Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2004, at Al (recounting story of daughter who suffers depression and is
hospitalized and treated after her mother was deported after a routine visit to
immigration). While the deportation described was not the result of an arrest, the
circumstances are illustrative of the fact that one cannot pull out one thread without
tugging at others within our society, and that the costs are not limited to the offender.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2000).

159.

LEGAL ACTION CTR., How TO GET SECTION

8 OR

PUBLIC HOUSING EVEN WITH A

CRIMINAL RECORD: A GUIDE FOR NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY APPLICANTS

AND THEIR ADVOCATES 24-26 (2006), http://lac.org/doc-library/lac/publications/How-to

GetSection_8_orPublicHousing.pdf. If a defendant has three or more convictions in a
five-year period, the bar is extended for an additional year from the last conviction. Id
160. Id. at 1.
161. Id. at 3,12-20.
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the mere fact of arrest may lead to violations of parole or probation.162
Parolees and probationers are required to report any police contact, and
even if they fight and prevail in a misdemeanor case, they are likely to
spend the time fighting such a case in jail at the taxpayers' expense.
Misdemeanors can also result in sentence enhancement under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and similar sentencing models by giving a
defendant points for criminal history. 63 In the city courts there is an
informal sentence enhancement effect. Typically, for a first misdemeanor
arrest for an offense to public order, a defendant will be offered a
disorderly conduct violation. For the second arrest, she will be offered a
misdemeanor conviction without jail time. For subsequent arrests, the
prosecutor will recommend incrementally harsher sanctions, including
longer jail sentences. Troubled teenagers who live in heavily policed areas
are likely to develop a record of multiple arrests early in life, whereas their
counterparts in less policed areas will rarely be arrested. Recently,
Operation Spotlight-Mayor Bloomberg's effort to "build on the zero
tolerance strategies of Mr. Giuliani"-has been singling out defendants
with multiple misdemeanor convictions for particularly aggressive
treatment.164 Arrests or misdemeanor convictions may also be used in
formulas that assess risk for recidivism and lead to denial of parole or
supervised release.'65 The end result is that the costs of an arrest-based
approach to order-maintenance policing will not simply include minimal
jail sentences, but may indirectly result in longer imprisonment on
unrelated charges.
d) Driving
In cases where a defendant is convicted of a crime such as possession
of a controlled substance, her driver's license or eligibility to apply for a
driver's license is automatically suspended for six months.166 Defense
162. Statistics for parole violations are not available at either the state or federal level.
Sara Steen & Tara Opsal, "Punishment on the Installment Plan": Individual-Level
Predictorsof ParoleRevocation in FourStates, 87 PRISON J. 344, 354 (2007).
163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(c) (2008) (providing for up to
four additional points for convictions resulting in sentences of less than sixty days, although
not all misdemeanor offenses will be counted).
164. William K. Rashbaum, In New Focus on Quality of Life, City Goes After Petty
Criminals,N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at Al. See also CRIMINAL COURT ANNUAL REPORT
2007, supra note 109, at 50 ("Operation Spotlight... focuses on chronic misdemeanor
offenders who commit a disproportionate amount of crime throughout the city.").
165. John Monahan, Prediction of Crime and Recidivism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME & JUSTICE 1125, 1128 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) (citing early first arrest as
predictive of likelihood of recidivism).
166. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 2007). Federal law makes a
portion of highway funding dependant on adopting such a policy unless the governor and
legislature both state their opposition. 23 U.S.C. § 159 (1998). While at first blush this
policy seems to be the height of rational law making-we certainly do not want people on
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counsel can ask for a waiver, which is within the judge's discretion to grant
(or to do so for limited purposes, such as to drive to and from work) based
on "compelling circumstances.', 6 7 As with many of the collateral
consequences of conviction, this one is rarely mentioned, explained, or
considered in the rapid-fire world of misdemeanor arraignments. In New
York City, this consequence may not be as dire as it is in other parts of the
state or country. Nevertheless, it significantly restricts access to jobs and
schools and may increase the amount of time and money spent in
commuting. For some defendants, such suspensions fuel a new round of
misdemeanor arrests based on driving with a suspended license.
e) Employment
A staggering number of professions require licenses from state
These professions range from barbers to attorneys.
authorities.168
Although in some licensing procedures arrests are only a hurdle to be
surmounted, in many others convictions can be to a bar to employment.
The Board of Education in New York City, for example, requires that
employees immediately report any arrest (including for a violation) and
often suspends or reassigns teachers from duty while a case is pending in
The military will not accept applicants while a
criminal court.'6 9
conditional discharge is still pending, even if there was no conviction or the

drugs driving-the policy is both over- and under-inclusive. The policy is under-inclusive in
that it has no effect on legally prescribed drugs, and those portions of society who are not
policed aggressively will continue to drive despite drug use. It is over-inclusive because any
drug conviction leads to the license suspension; people who would never drive under the
influence are nevertheless barred from driving. We may choose to accept such a policy
anyway, but we ought to examine the impact on employment, education, and social capital
before taking licenses from drivers who have not been convicted for any traffic-related
infraction.
167. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 2007).
168. For a list of over 100 professions that require licenses in New York, see N.Y. State
Dep't of Labor, Occupations Licensed or Certified by New York State (last visited May 26,
2009), http://www.labor.state.ny.us/workforceindustrydata/lstrain.shtm#olcnys.
169. Procedures in Cases of the Arrest of Employees, N.Y. City Dep't of Educ.
Chancellor's Reg. C-105, at 7-9 (2003), available at http://docs.nycenet.edu/docushare/
dsweb/Get/Document-55/C-105.pdf. The result of this preemptive suspension policy can
mean the loss of talented and dedicated school teachers and principals while questionable
arrests for minor offenses drag through the school system. See CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU,
OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK"
PRACTICES 80-82 (1999) (describing the case of a black high school science teacher who

was arrested after questioning an officer who stopped his car about the basis for the stop,
and was then prevented from teaching during several months, until the charges against him
were dismissed). This is particularly the case where police are now stationed in schools and
arrest school faculty for contradicting their mandates. See Elissa Gootman, Arrest of a
Bronx PrincipalSpurs Criticism of the City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at B3 (describing
reassignment of a principle arrested by on-site police after attempting to moderate a
dispute between an officer and a student).
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conviction was for a noncriminal offense.17 ° While New York State
Human Rights Law has provisions intended to protect people with
convictions from discrimination, 7 ' the easy availability on commercial
databases of criminal records (and even noncriminal records) undermines
these provisions. 72 Further, both state and federal criminal databases are
incomplete and inaccurate.'7 3 These errors mean that even people with no
criminal record may be denied employment because of inaccurate
information in criminal databases.
Even where no bar to employment exists, employers favor applicants
who have not had contact with the criminal justice system. A recent study
of the impact of incarceration on the employment opportunities of collegeeducated job applicants demonstrated that, though applicants were
otherwise equally qualified, the criminal record of a white job applicant
reduced the likelihood of a positive response (an offer or a callback) by
50% (from 34% to 17%). 114 For a black candidate with no convictions
whatsoever and the same qualifications, the likelihood of getting a callback
was only 14% (less than a white person with a conviction). 75 A similarly
qualified black applicant with a conviction received callbacks in only 5% of
job applications.17 6 While the study examined the impact of a felony
170. Gary Muldoon, CollateralEffects of a Criminal Conviction, N.Y. ST. B.J., JulyAug. 1998, at 26, 29. By contrast, the military has become increasingly willing to grant
waivers for those with misdemeanor, or even felony, convictions. Lizette Alvarez, Army
andMarineCorps GrantMore Felony Waivers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, at A21.
171. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15) (McKinney 2008); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750-753
(McKinney 2008). Employers with more than ten employees may not deny employment or
licensure because of a criminal record "unless there is a direct relationshipbetween the
offense and the job or license sought, or unless hiring or licensure would create an
unreasonable risk to property or to public or individual safety." Legal Action Center,
Overview
of
State
Laws
that
Ban
Discrimination
By
Employers
4,
http://www.lac.org/toolkits/standards/Fourteen-StateLaws.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
172. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 53-55;
NYSBA RE-ENTRY REPORT, supra note 6, at 384.
173. OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 16-17;
NYSBA RE-ENTRY REPORT, supra note 6, at 386 (reporting that 87% of New York DCJS
rap sheets contain errors).
174. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. Soc. 937, 957-58
(2003). To examine the effect of a criminal record, a pair of black and a pair of white
applicants applied for the same entry-level jobs in a number of fields. Id. at 946-47. Their
resumes were designed to reflect the same qualifications, and they were trained to fill out
job applications and answer interview questions in the same ways. Id at 957 n.33. The
experiment participants were also chosen to be of similar attractiveness and pleasantness.
Id Each candidate applied to half of the jobs indicating no criminal record and another
half indicating a criminal record. Id. at 947. The original experiment took place in
Milwaukee, but the experiment has been repeated in New York with Latino, black, and
white applicants. See DEVAH PAGER & BRUCE WESTERN, RACE AT WORK: REALITIES OF
RACE AND CRIMINAL RECORD IN THE NYC JOB MARKET (2005), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/pdfrace-report-web.pdf.
175. PAGER, supra note 174, at 957-58.
176. Id.at 958.
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conviction followed by incarceration on the ability to obtain employment,
it is likely that a misdemeanor conviction would have significant adverse
impact on black job applicants, particularly in light of the fact that black
applicants with no felony record were already less likely to get a job than
white applicants with a record.177
This assertion is confirmed by several older studies which indicate
that, all else being equal, contact with the criminal justice system (even
contact resulting in acquittal) is likely to negatively affect employment
opportunities. 178 Where records of convictions for misdemeanors are
erroneous, employers are nonetheless unlikely to look beyond the
conviction. A recent Bronx Defenders publication describes a client
whose criminal record indicated erroneously that he had a 1993
misdemeanor conviction. 179 Although the defendant had no other arrests
eleven years later, a number of employers refused him employment, citing
this conviction.
While a study is needed to determine the impact of misdemeanor or
violation convictions and arrests in terms of employment opportunity, it is
quite clear that the impact exists and is negative. It is also clear that the
family of a defendant who is unable to obtain gainful employment is likely
to suffer.
2. Impact on the Community
The impact on the communities that are subjected to the greatest
policing will, of course, be mixed. On the one hand, to the extent that
policing efforts result in more order and/or less fear, the benefits may be
very positive. On the other hand, the externalized costs of thousands of
arrests are not limited to the arrestees. 8 ° Loss of income or employment
due to an arrest for a minor offense affects not only the wage earner but
also her entire family. Similarly, payment of surcharges or civil judgments
that mar credit records also affect the economic well-being of entire
families. Evictions or exclusions from public housing tear at the fabric of
families. Barriers to work, education, and military service in the form of

177. Id.

178. Id. at 942-43 (citing, e.g., Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two
Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133 (1962); R.H. Finn & Patricia A. Fontaine, The
Association Between Selected Characteristicsand Perceived Employability of Offenders,
12 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 353 (1985)).
179. Back to Work! The Civil Action Project Helps Clear a Client's Record, BRONX
DEFENDERS UPDATE (Bronx Defenders, Bronx, N.Y.), Spring 2004.
180. See Tracey L. Meares, ChartingRace and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward
Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement. Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 137, 163 (1997) (noting that tough-on-drug policies tend to "exacerbate the
precursors to social organization disruption such as low economic status, family disruption,
and unemployment").
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misdemeanor offenses limit the opportunities not only of the arrestee, but
also of her entire family. As suggested by the work of Devah Pager, the
perception of criminality may attach to young men of color who have no
convictions and make their likelihood of even being interviewed for an
entry-level job less than a white person with a conviction. 81 Similarly,
ZTP reinforces the stereotype of black criminality. 1" It is easy to imagine
that only "criminals" are affected by these policing decisions, but the
repercussions of being arrested for an open container of alcohol or for
selling umbrellas on the street in an attempt to earn a living for one's
family are borne by the larger
community, and indeed by blacks and
183
Latinos across the country.
3. Costs to the PoliceDepartment
The Police Department is burdened by the substantial overtime costs

incurred processing misdemeanor arrests.1 "4 Of course, even when police
are not drawing overtime pay, the choice to process an arrest for a
misdemeanor or noncriminal offense removes the police officer from the
street for several hours. In addition to these concrete costs, the police
suffer from a loss of legitimacy in some communities. 85 For individuals
subjected to arrest in a system where people of color are heavily

overrepresented, the experience creates or strengthens perceptions of race

and class biases on the part of the police.'8 6 The person arrested for having
an open beer on a neighborhood stoop is fully aware that such rules are
flouted in Central Park during classical music performances with no
repercussions."'
Police officers themselves have complained that
181. PAGER, supra note 174, at 960. See also Meares, supra note 41, at 678 (discussing
stigmatizing effect of criminal justice system on law abiders).
182. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 815 (1999) ("[Tlhe damage
inflicted by the social norm of presumed Black criminality is immeasurable.").
183. Meares, supra note 180, at 163.
184. In 2003, sixty-three million dollars was spent in arrest processing, with the average
overtime cost per arrest in New York City at $183. BERNARD O'BRIEN, N.Y. CITY INDEP.
BUDGET

OFFICE,

FISCAL

BRIEF,

POLICE

OVERTIME:

TRACKING

THE

BIG

GROWTH IN SPENDING 7 (2004), available at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/
NYPDOTfiscalBrief.pdf. The budget for Operation Condor, which targets narcotics and
quality-of-life offenses, peaked at over 100 million dollars per year for overtime costs in the
fiscal year ending June 2001. Kevin Flynn, City's Deficit Forces Police to Study Cuts in
Overtime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at B1.
185. Roberts, supra note 182, at 817.
186. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 10-11 (2002).
187. Richard R.W. Brooks, Fearand Fairnessin the City CriminalEnforcement and
Perceptions of Fairnessin Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1267 (2000)
("[D]ata suggest that favorable perceptions of the police are negatively correlated with
arrest rates for low-level offenses of vandalism and vagrancy, and positively correlated with
arrest rates for violent crimes.").
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aggressive policing of quality-of-life offenses has made them feel
"unpopular, even despised, in neighborhoods they helped make safer."188
'
4. ProceduralJustice and the CriminalJustice System
Research conducted in the field of procedural justice reveals
additional costs associated with the way minor criminal cases are currently
processed."i 9 This valuable work demonstrates that a person subjected to
the justice system will evaluate that system based on the perceived
"fairness" of the process, rather than the favorability of the outcome.19
Fairness judgments lead to the following results: first, to the extent that
procedures are seen as "fair," the system will be seen as legitimate; and
second, legitimacy leads to a willingness to comply with societal norms.
On the other hand, the perception that a process is not "fair" may result in
a sense of betrayal and defiance. Thus, being subjected to procedures that
are perceived as "unfair" may lead individuals to reoffend.191 At the very
least, being subjected to procedures that are seen as unfair is unlikely to
deter future similar behavior.192
Unfortunately, the process associated with minor offenses in the
criminal justice system bears few of the hallmarks that social psychologists
have identified as important to the perception of procedural justice. It is
less important that the outcomes for minor offenses in the criminal justice
system be "favorable" (dismissals, non-criminal convictions, community
service, and little or no jail time are common dispositions)." 3 Rather, the
188. Kevin Flynn, Police Feel Scorn on Beat and Pressurefrom Above, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2000, at Al.
189. LIND & TYLER, supra note 8, at 94-95.
190. Id.at 1-2.
191. See Robert White, CurtailingYouth: A Critiqueof Coercive Crime Prevention,in
CIVIL REMEDIES AND CRIME PREVENTION 117, 124 (Lorraine Green Mazerolle & Jan
Roehl eds., 1998) ("[A] consequence of street policing as crime prevention ... is the
creation of 'criminals."'); Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Neighborhood,
Crime, and Incarcerationin New York City, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 97 (2004)
(explaining that drug enforcement appears to have an adverse effect on crime rates);
Raymond Paternoster, Ronet Bachman, Robert Brame & Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Fair
ProceduresMatter? The Effect of ProceduralJustice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 163, 182-84, 192 (1997) (in a randomized study of domestic violence arrests,
defendants who were treated politely and given an opportunity to speak were less likely to
reoffend than those who were treated less politely); Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance,
Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 445, 460-61 (1993) (proposing that defiance to unfair sanctions may explain
reoffending for some individuals).
192. For example, in an article about his experience being arrested in Red Hook for
disorderly conduct as a result of being drunk in public, the author indicated that he went
straight out to purchase more beer, and a co-arrestee stated that he was going to buy more
marijuana upon his release. Christopher Ketcham, Roach Motel, SALON, Oct. 17, 2002,
http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/1O/17/jailtime/.
193. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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elements associated with fair process have been identified by some
scholars as representativeness, consistency, impartiality, accuracy,
correctability, and ethicality. 94
The first of these elements, representativeness, refers to the
opportunity to consider everyone's concerns, most importantly to give
voice to all participants.19 s Procedural justice research demonstrates that
even when a person is given the opportunity to express her views after an
unfavorable decision has been made, the opportunity to be heard will
result in a more favorable view of the fairness of the process.196
Unfortunately, both the adversarial system and the system for adjudicating
minor offenses deprive arrestees of the opportunity to make themselves
heard. For a person who wishes to fight a case, defense counsel must
guard the right to remain silent and will instruct the client to remain silent
during the many appearances that precede the ultimate dismissal without a
trial for the typical misdemeanor or noncriminal offense.
Making
statements to the court simply creates evidence that is fodder for later
cross-examination. Even the attorney's statements can be used to impeach
a defendant at trial.197 Though the cases are unlikely to ever be tried,
making a statement, naming defense witnesses, or revealing any part of the
defense case before trial is a strategic mistake that few defense attorneys
make. 9 ' While the typical arrestee on these minor cases is represented by
counsel,
that representation
actually
leads
to
a lack
of
"representativeness" by systematically silencing the arrestee and not giving
voice to the defendant for the months that a case may be pending.
For a defendant who opts to take whatever deal is offered at
arraignments, the only answer that the court wants to hear from her is a
series of "yes" answers to leading questions about whether she is guilty and
whether she is waiving her rights voluntarily. The defendant who attempts
to explain, particularly one who attempts to offer a semi-exculpatory
explanation, is abruptly and sometimes harshly hushed and told that if she
does not want the deal, she does not have to take it. One danger of letting
anyone speak, even to apologize, is that she may unwittingly articulate a
defense and disrupt whatever disposition has been agreed to. The typical
appearance, after twenty hours of waiting, is rarely longer than five minutes,
194. TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. Huo,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 90-93 (1997). See LIND & TYLER, supra note 8, at

94-101, for a discussion of process control.
195. TYLER, BOECKMANN, SMITH & Huo, supra note 194, at 91.
196. Id.at 90.
197. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 98 N.Y.2d 226 (2002); People v. Rivera, 58 A.D.2d 147,
148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 989 (1978).
198. RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 8-208 (11th ed.
1995). Sometimes a defense attorney will disclose the defense if necessary to obtain
favorable bail terms (so if one has spoken to witnesses or confirmed an alibi this may be
disclosed), but this is rarely at issue in a minor case.
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and during that time there is no opportunity for a person to explain,
apologize, or admit or deny her conduct. In the failure to give arrestees a
voice, the criminal justice system loses a critical opportunity to gain
legitimacy and foster willingness to comply with the law.
Consistency refers to the consistency across groups and over time. 99
From the perspective of a person arrested and appearing in the criminal
courts in New York City, the racial disparities in arrest numbers alone
undermine sought-after consistency, regardless of whether there is any racial
disparity with regard to outcome. Further, because there are many
defendants with different records, and various judges treat minor offenses in
very different ways, the outcomes will appear to vary significantly for similar
arrests among defendants and over time. z20 While I suspect that there is
significant consistency based on offense record, arrest to arraignment time,
and other factors, there would likely be no appearanceof consistency to the
casual observer or to a person going through the system.
Impartiality' refers not so much to the fair treatment of people across
groups but to the demeanor of the decisionmaker.
Does the
decisionmaker appear to be neutral between the parties and not motivated
by self interest? In this regard, it is difficult to venture an opinion as to the
perceptions of arrestees, family members waiting for arrestees, and other
visitors to courtrooms.
Judges vary in their demeanor, but most
arraignment judges have little to do with either side. Some will listen more
politely to prosecutors and express impatience with defense counsel, but
others will express concern for defendants or skepticism for prosecutors, or
even impatience with prosecutors for inflexibility on minor offenses. It is
likely that only a survey could begin to uncover these perceptions and that
they might vary from judge to judge. My guess is that, in this regard, the
criminal justice system in New York City might score fairly well because
many of the judges display a relatively restrained and neutral demeanor.2 °2
Accuracy is another fundamental component by which people
evaluate the fairness of procedures.2 3 The perception of accuracy is based
on the use of accurate information and thorough fact-finding to reach
199. TYLER, BOECKMANN, SMITH & Huo, supra note 194, at 90.
200. Repeat players and institutional actors are likely to discern patterns that suggest
there is a great deal of consistency on many minor offenses. Prosecutors offer "standard
deals" for particular offenses. Nevertheless, defense attorneys are able to persuade
prosecutors to undercut standard offers in conversations prior to court appearances, and
frequently the reason for such concessions is not stated on the record.
201. Impartiality includes bias suppression, honesty, and effort to be fair. LIND &
TYLER, supra note 8, at 107-08; TYLER, BOECKMANN, SMITH & Huo, supra note 194, at 90.
202. The outcome in local courts across the state and across the country might be very
different. See William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of New York, Abuses of Law and Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at Al (describing the "second-class system of justice"
perpetuated in New York's local courts, which hear over 300,000 criminal cases a year).
203. TYLER, supranote 8, at 118-20.
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informed opinions. Since there is no testing of accuracy of information,
very little information, 24 and a willingness to dispose of minor cases with
no fact-finding, the system for adjudication of minor offenses provides no
appearance that accuracy is important. In fact, in the cases where a person
accepting a plea states that she did not commit an offense, she is more
often than not told that she cannot have the plea if she does not admit the
offense, and is then asked again whether she committed the offense. If she
says yes on the second try (or even a third if the judge is patient) and goes
on to agree that she is saying yes because it is true, this is clearly good
enough for all concerned.
Correctability refers to the availability of a means for review and
correction of erroneous results.0 5 It is provided in the criminal court
context by the availability of appellate review. Whether the availability of
appeal for such summary proceedings is sufficient to satisfy this element or
not is not clear. Given the fact that over 99% of convictions are obtained
by guilty pleas and that pleading guilty substantially limits the available
grounds for appeal, the scope of appellate review is quite limited.
Nevertheless, it is the perception of correctability that is important, and
the fact that all defendants who plead guilty are advised that they have the
right to appeal may create a perception of correctability.
A final and critical element contributing to perceptions of procedural
justice is the ethicality of the process. Factors that procedural justice
scholars relate to ethicality include whether the process comports with
fundamental moral and ethical values, whether rights are respected, and
whether people are treated politely and with respect. 2 6 These judgments
may relate to either court process or treatment at arrest or during prearraignment detention. Narratives about the arrest experience for minor
offenses suggest that at every juncture arrestees may experience treatment
that does not comport with ethicality judgments. 27 For example, arrestees
are certainly not housed or fed decently, and police may not treat them
politely. Defense attorneys may be skeptical, particularly of claims of
innocence, or give little time or attention to defendants; and defendants
204. At arraignments, where 60% of cases are disposed of, there are typically no police
reports, no supporting documents, and only a short factual description of the offense in the
accusatory instrument. While some boroughs have open file discovery, the police fill out
very little paperwork on minor arrests and tend to use boiler-plate language. For a
discussion of discovery in misdemeanor cases in New York, see Jenny Roberts, Too Little,
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial
Discoveryin CriminalCases,31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1128-40 (2004).
205. TYLER, BOECKMANN, SMITH & Huo, supra note 194, at 91.
206. Id at 94; LIND & TYLER, supra note 8, at 109.
207. See, e.g., Bryonn Bain, Three Days in NYC Jails, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 24-30,
2003, at 30; Ketcham, supra note 192; The Assimilated Negro, The Time I Got Arrested for
Holding a DVD, http://theassimilatednegro.blogspot.com/2005/11/time-i-got-arrested-forholding-dvd.html (Nov. 2, 2005, 1:20 EST).
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may perceive judges or prosecutors as unwilling to listen to them. Even if
no specific or intentional rudeness is experienced, the entire process is
dehumanizing. 2°8 Further, fundamental values of proportionality may be
offended when arrestees spend days and nights in jail for minor offenses.
Evidence from empirical work that examines perceptions of procedural
justice demonstrates that perceived fair treatment is more important than
outcome in predicting reoffending rates.20 9 Put another way: treatment that
is not considered fair, polite, and respectful; that does not give voice to the
parties involved; that does not seek accurate results based on thorough
information gathering; but is instead perceived as inconsistent among groups
and disproportionate to offenses, may make future offenses by the same
people more rather than less likely. Rather than serving as a deterrent to
offenses to order, or even more serious offenses, aggressive arrest policies
for minor offenses are associated with unfavorable perceptions of law
enforcement. 21' The perception of legitimacy in our criminal justice system
is key to compliance, and the experience of being treated in ways that are
perceived as unfair undermines such a perception. Further, the deterrent
effect of arrest is reduced by overuse for minor offenses. Fear of arrest is
diminished once it is experienced, and the stigma associated with arrest is
generally diluted when folks are arrested for selling flowers or drinking beer
on their own stoops. 21 Thus, voluntary compliance stemming from respect,
fear-based compliance stenming from deterrence, and shame-based
compliance stemming from stigma are all reduced by overuse of arrest for
minor offenses.
5. Substantive Justice
Another casualty of ZTP is substantive justice. While misdemeanor
trials have not been plentiful for many years (if they ever were), they
continue to decrease in numbers. 212 The majority of cases that are tried are
208. A conference working group, which included judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and court staff, agreed that criminal court is "dehumanizing" and inconsistent
with concepts of individualized justice. Rayner, supra note 114, at 1039-40, 1054.
209. See, e.g., Paternoster, Bachman, Brame & Sherman, supra note 191, at 182-83,
192-93. In this particular study, domestic violence arrestees were more likely to reoffend
than individuals who were warned but not arrested. However, arrestees who reported
being treated fairly had recidivism rates at approximately the level of the non-arrested
individuals. Thus fair treatment improved recidivism rates, while arrest did not deter
recidivism as some deterrence theorists would predict.
210. Brooks, supra note 187, at 1267 (noting also that favorable perceptions are
associated with effective policing of violent crime).
211. See Daniel S. Nagin, CriminalDeterrence Research at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century,23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 22-23 (1998) (discussing how frequent sanctions "may
erode the foundation of the deterrent effect-fear of stigmatization").
212. In 1990, when only 40% of cases were disposed of at arraignment, and 0.4% were
tried, there was already a good case for the proposition that substantive justice was not an
outcome of the criminal court. HARRY I. SUBIN, THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT:
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harms to people or harms to property. 13 Order maintenance arrests rarely
result in trials. 214 After multiple appearances, most defendants who
initially wanted a trial will either accept a disposition 211 or their cases will
be dismissed based on speedy trial grounds.216 Police can, with impunity,
arrest people on minor charges whether or not they have probable cause;
they can stop and frisk whether or not they have reasonable suspicion.217
The basis for arrests and frisks will almost never be tested."' Nor will
unintentional police errors be discovered. Defendants may, with nearly
equal impunity, demand a trial and expect a dismissal if they can make
multiple court appearances for months or years. 219 As the system works
now, the innocent do not have the chance to obtain public vindication, and
the guilty can often evade trial and conviction.
THE CASE FOR ABOLITION 1, 4 (Ctr. for Research in Crime & Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of

Law 1992) (noting that if all misdemeanor judges spent all their time trying cases rather
than at calendar control, only 2% of misdemeanor arrests could result in trial). Such a lack
of resources has the effect of insulating misdemeanor arrests from review, resulting in
"virtually unfettered, unchecked police activity and discretion." Steven Zeidman, Policing
the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 321
(2005). Today, less than 0.3% of misdemeanor cases are ever tried. Id. at 321 n.35; DCJS
Trial Statistics, supra note 142. Moreover, 73% of cases were disposed of at arraignment in
1998. Solomon, supra note 47, at 5.
213. See supra note 142.
214. See supra note 142; Zeidman, supra note 212, at 321 n.35 ("[T]he New York City
misdemeanor trial rate in 2003 was less than one third of one percent.").
215. For a description of the plea bargain process, see DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE:
ONE LAWYER'S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 157-69 (2006)
(describing how a client who is innocent and wants a trial will eventually take a plea). See
also Weinstein, supra note 100, at 1158.
216. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2008) (requiring the prosecution to
answer ready for trial within 90 days on an A misdemeanor and 60 days on a B
misdemeanor, but excluding various periods of delay attributed to defense consent, motion
practice, defendant's absence and other obstacles to trial).
217. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing the framework for stopping and
frisking people based on less than probable cause). While this article does not address the
impact of the over 500,000 "stops and frisks" that the police undertake annually in New
York; many of the same procedural justice, race, and community impact issues discussed in
this article are also raised by such processes. See, e.g., Trymaine Lee, As Officers Stop and
Frisk,Residents Raise Their Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at A31 (discussing the effects
of this police practice on the community of Red Hook, Brooklyn).
218. See Terry,392 U.S. at 26.
219. The mean age at the time of bench trial verdict in misdemeanor cases before the
Criminal Court (exclusive of Bronx cases) was 340.6 days in 2007. CRIMINAL COURT
ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 109, at 55. Because this far exceeds the time permitted
under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW Sec. 30.30 cases will often be dismissed for speedy trial
delays. Statistics for the number of speedy trial dismissals are not readily available,
however, a speedy trial dismissal is a common outcome of litigating misdemeanors. See
Steven Zeidman, SacrificialLambs or the Chosen Few?."The Impact of Student Defenders
on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, n.82 (1996) (48.5% of dismissals
obtained by clinic were due to Denial of Speedy Trial); Weinstein, supra note 100, at 1169,
1172 (discussing the interplay between speedy trial rules, repeat appearances, and the cost
of litigating a misdemeanor).
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6 Attorney EthicalRules
A final problem with the mass processing of misdemeanors and lesser
offenses through the criminal justice system without regard to collateral
consequences is the systematic violation of basic requirements of
professional responsibility for defense attorneys and prosecutors.2 2 °
Prosecutors are required to "exercise sound discretion ' '22' and to pursue
justice 222 but can hardly exercise discretion or pursue justice without
investigating the facts. More specifically, the American Bar Association's
Defense Function standards require defense attorneys to investigate the
facts regardless of a defendant's admission of guilt,223 and "under no
circumstances [should they] recommend to a defendant acceptance of a
plea unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has been
completed, including an analysis of controlling law. 2 24 Yet defense
attorneys counsel clients to take hundreds and perhaps thousands of pleas
in the course of a year with no independent factual investigation and little
or no discovery.225 "Counseling" on whether to waive constitutional rights
and become exposed to myriad collateral consequences takes place in two,
three, or five minutes. Prosecutors similarly recommend dispositions
without ever speaking to witnesses or evaluating credibility and weight of
evidence and with no information about potential collateral
consequences.2 26 Judges disregard these breaches of attorneys' duties on
both sides of each case and accept dispositions on the majority of
misdemeanor cases in arraignments. The motivation for such practice is
not to harm clients, but to save them from repeated court visits. However,
220. Professional standards for lawyers for both the defense and prosecution define
the basic duty of competency owed. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 31.2(c), 4-6.1(b) (1999); NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1991). It is the duty of the prosecutor "to seek justice"; one
component of that duty, often left undone, entails familiarity with the full range of
collateral consequences because they are, as described by the former president of the
National District Attorneys Association, "a new form of mandated sentences." Johnson,
supra note 146, at 33.
221. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION, 3-1.2(b), available
at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc-toc.html.
222. Id. at 3-1.2(c).
223. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION, 4-4.1(a), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/dfunc-toc.html.
224. Idat 4-6.1(b).
225. See, e.g., COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT
TO
THE
CHIEF
JUDGE
OF
THE
STATE
OF
NEW
YORK
24-25 (2006),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommissionreport06.pdf.
226. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE:
THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS, 35 (2009)
[hereinafter
NACDL,
MINOR
CRIMES,
MASSIVE
WASTE],
available at

http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf (discussing
inability of defense counsel to investigate or counsel clients due to excessive caseloads).
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the result is the routine breach of the standards of professional
responsibility applicable to all attorneys. The public is deprived of the
informed representation of the district attorney and the accuracy that
adversarial criminal justice system is designed to ensure.

IV.
REDUCING THE COSTS OF ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING

Many of the costs identified in the previous section can be reduced or
eliminated by any number of options available to thoughtful policymakers
and criminal justice actors. Examples already exist of a slight trend in this
direction. Some of these possibilities reduce various costs while not
significantly changing others. For example, issuance of summonses may
not necessarily alleviate perceptions of procedural injustice, but it does
reduce commitment of police resources to processing and eliminate the
ugliest facet of the criminal court: pre-arraignment detention. In this
section, I will briefly propose a number of avenues for reducing the costs
of aggressive order-maintenance policing. The proposals are not aimed at
reducing policing, but at reducing the costs of aggressive policing of minor
offenses.
Many of these suggestions would presumably affect only the cost side of
the cost-benefit analysis of aggressive misdemeanor policing. Adopting
these suggestions should not have adverse effects on either the causal link
between aggressive order-maintenance policing and reduction of serious
crime (to the extent that such a link exists), nor should they reduce the gains
in the area of quality of life and reduction of fear. In fact, to the extent that
these proposals improve perceptions regarding procedural justice and
remove barriers to education, employment, housing, and benefits, they
should increase the efficacy of order-maintenance policing and free police
resources for community patrol and targeted policing initiatives. By
contrast, the current approach, which creates tens of thousands of new
criminal and quasi-criminal records and instills in hundreds of thousands of
individuals negative perceptions about the procedural fairness of the
criminal justice system, almost certainly has a positive correlation with both
serious crime and disorder, thereby creating negative feedback that
undercuts the positive gains of order-maintenance policing.
Other suggestions that follow are more expansive and thus may reduce
costs but also potentially reduce benefits. It is my belief that the cost
reduction would substantially outweigh the reduction in benefits, but such
assumptions should certainly be put to the test, either by reform coupled
with careful empirical review or by pilot projects to study such causal links.
I will organize the discussion of proposals according to the institution
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that could intervene to reduce costs, hoping that one or more of these
institutions may pursue these proposals. The reason for this organization
is that the institutional structures and incentives are perhaps the greatest
barriers to reform, and they differ among the institutions. I will begin with
institutions that could most readily create the broadest reforms and
conclude with those that can attempt to mitigate some of the costs on a
case-by-case basis.
A. The Legislature
There are many routes that the legislature might take to reduce the
costs of order-maintenance policing. I will address five possible reforms,
organizing them from the most sweeping to the most minor. These are
decriminalizing particular crimes and offenses, changing arrest-processing
provisions for particular crimes, changing sealing provisions for minor
crimes and offenses, and changing or eliminating surcharge provisions.
1. DecriminalizingOffenses
Although the first of these proposals may sound quite radical, from a
historical perspective what is arguably more radical is the extent and
pervasiveness of criminal punishment for behavior that causes only the
most minor harm to others or property. Our criminal law has, like an
invasive weed, permeated all areas of behavior such that, if it were to be
uniformly and perfectly enforced, there would be few people without a
criminal record.227 Further, the crimes and the classifications of offenses
largely arose at a time when collateral consequences for misdemeanors
were fewer and less pervasive. My purpose in categorizing misdemeanors
according to the object of their harm and in focusing within the categories
on particular offenses is to invite the review of each offense. Must trespass
be a violation of the penal law subjecting a person to arrest and creating a
permanent record? Prostitution? Possession of marijuana?
Other
controlled substances? Should jumping a turnstile be an A misdemeanor?
The legislature should review each of these offenses carefully and
reevaluate whether it is necessary to prosecute such offenses in the
criminal justice system when so many significant harms might flow from
such prosecution. If only one category were to be removed from the
criminal justice system, thousands or tens of thousands could be spared
some of the costs discussed in Part III. Similar review should be
undertaken with regard to the non-printable offenses that account for over

227. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 513-15 (2001) (describing the growth of categories of criminal offenses, from less
than 200 federal crimes in the 19th century to nearly 650 titles in the federal criminal code
today, and noting also that state criminal law has undergone a similar expansion).
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15,000 arrests per year.
A decision to decriminalize does not necessarily mean a decision to
condone, permit, or not police such behavior. In fact, the decision to treat
a matter as a noncriminal offense opens up possibilities for re-integrative
and non-adversarial solutions that can strengthen rather than undermine
social order. One example of such an alternative approach exists in cases
of failure to pay subway or bus fare, which is currently handled in two
parallel systems-one criminal, one civil. 28
The unlucky are charged with the crime of theft of services, 29 typically
arrested, treated to a day in arrest processing, and sentenced to jail,
community service, or time served, or given an adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal, in the whirlwind of arraignments. If they
choose to fight the charges, they can expect to make multiple appearances
at the courthouse and will probably never get a trial.230 Whether the
defendant pleads or fights, she will most probably never have the
opportunity to have a voice in the proceeding or tell her side of the story to
anyone. This is particularly worrisome where the defendant is falsely
accused. The almost complete absence of trials means that the credibility
of police officers will never be tested. As the literature on procedural
justice demonstrates, the outcome is less important than the chance to be
heard." ' This, in turn, predicts willingness to comply with or defy the law
in the future.
The more fortunate defendant accused of failing to pay the fare on a
subway or bus is given a civil citation. 32 These citations can be paid by
mail or answered in person at the Transit Adjudication Bureau (TAB).233
A person who challenges the citation at the TAB on the appearance date
will be heard the same day by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). That
hearing allows the person who received the citation to sit face to face with
the ALJ and explain what happened. 34 If there is a challenge to the facts
alleged by the police officer, then a second date is arranged for the police
to answer to the citizen. The TAB will obtain Metrocard records to
determine whether the fare was indeed paid. During a day that I watched
228. The choice of whether to issue a summons for the civil offense or arrest an
individual for the crime of theft of services is entirely at police discretion. Such discretion
will be informed by any number of factors, including (1) whether an officer can afford to be
off the streets for several hours, (2) whether the officer wants to spend several hours
processing the arrest, (3) whether the person who failed to pay fare has identification, and
(4) whether that person treats the officer respectfully.
229. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 2008).
230. See supraPart II.A.4.
231. See supraPart III.B.4.
232. 21 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 1050.4 (2007).
233. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1209-a (McKinney 2008).
234. Several ALJs sit in small rooms and hear one respondent at a time. A respondent
is free to bring witnesses or documentation.
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TAB proceedings, adjournments were made for those who contested their
guilt. Even more impressive were respondents who came to TAB to
explain that they normally paid their fares but did not have the money on
the day they were stopped. While the fines were not reversed in these
cases, I observed none of the anger or frustration presented in the endless
appearances in criminal court.235 The opportunity to be heard and to assert
a general pattern of lawfulness appeared community-affirming in a way
that no interaction I have ever observed in the criminal justice system has
been.236
There are many options for decriminalization, including complete
decriminalization of particular offenses, decriminalization of first
offenses,237 or the creation of civil citation alternatives (as with the
turnstile-jump example) that would leave discretion to police officers
whether to charge individuals with a crime or issue a citation.
The city counsel could most certainly require citations rather than
arrest for the numerous unclassified misdemeanors and violations of the
city code that are not even included in most statistics about the criminal
justice system.
2. Change ArrestProcessingProvisions
The legislature could, without decriminalizing offenses (or in
conjunction with decriminalization of some offenses), change arrestprocessing provisions. This would reduce the cost of missed work days to
defendants, decrease the amount of overtime paid to police officers for
processing defendants after their shift has ended, and ameliorate
perceptions of procedural justice. For example, legislation could easily
require that those accused of misdemeanors or certain classes of
misdemeanors (offenses to order, for example) be arrested, searched,
printed, and released if the fingerprints showed no warrants.2 38 Following
235. No doubt anger erupts in this setting as well. I do not begin to suggest that this
route will eliminate all conflict, but as the research in the area of procedural justice has
shown, process is invariably more important to litigants than outcome.
236. The shortcoming of any non-arrest system is the likelihood of non-appearance. In
the case of the TAB, about 25% of the 100,000 issued civil citations neither appeared nor
paid on their first date. Response to FOIL Request, Transit Adjudication Bureau,
Statistics, 2000-03 (Dec. 9, 2004) (on file with the author). In discussions with the Bureau,
they indicated that over the longer term most individuals paid the fines either to clear up
their records for employment, the military, or mortgage approval; or as a direct
garnishment from tax returns. Interview with John Risi, Legal Director, Transit
Adjudication Bureau, in N.Y., N.Y. (June 25, 2004).
237. There are a number of offenses that are more serious if committed by someone
with a prior criminal record or someone who has previously committed the same offense,
including loitering for the purpose of prostitution or criminal possession of a weapon. N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 240.37(2), 265.02(1) (McKinney 2008).
238. Alternatively, and more conservatively, release might be required for those with
no felony records or no offenses against persons, or for those with no record of arrests
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such procedures, weapons would still be seized and deterrence maintained.
Those who were serious criminals would be treated as such, and those who
were not would be released to appear in court at a later date. Additional
advantages to such procedures would be shorter arrest processing times
and quicker return of officers to the street. 239 While the procedural justice
benefit of such a compromise would be unclear (it is not outcome-arrest
or no arrest-that is critical, but treatment),240 the economic repercussions
of missed work and lost jobs would be substantial.
3. Change SealingProvisions
One of the most serious consequences of misdemeanor, and even
violation, convictions is the effect such convictions have on employment
opportunities. The legislature could require automatic sealing of court
records for violation convictions. In addition, legislation could be passed
to seal misdemeanor arrest records after some number of years. The
legislature might also provide for automatic expungement of records of
violations, certain misdemeanors, or all misdemeanors
that did not involve
2 41
harm to persons after a certain period of time.
4. Change SurchargeProvisions
Mandatory surcharges and Crime Victims' Assistance Fees could
similarly be redesigned to serve restorative purposes rather than to further
cripple those without resources to pay these fees. Until 1995 the
"mandatory" surcharge was waivable and courts would not impose such a
surcharge on indigent defendants.242 Certainly there was some wisdom to
that approach. Other potential improvements might be a progressive
surcharge based on ability to pay or type of offense. Finally, in victimless
offenses no Crime Victims' Assistance Fee should be imposed.

whatsoever.
239. It is unclear how police officer incentives would work out under such a system.
On the one hand, some officers are motivated by the overtime that accompanies the hours
required to transport a defendant and work with the District Attorney's Office to process a
complaint. On the other hand, some officers may be dissuaded from making an arrest when
doing so will result in a loss of hours of sleep or time that might be spent with their families.
240. See supra Part III.
241. See Demleitner, supra note 2, at 162 (supporting expungement as an "attempt to
ameliorate the negative impact of collateral consequences after sentencing"). See also Yue
Ma, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Plea Bargainingin the United States, France, Germany
and Italy: A ComparativePerspective,12 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REv. 22 (2002) (noting that for
minor offenses France and Italy have automatic expungement of records).
242. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 420.35 (McKinney 2008). For a discussion of the change
in the mandatory surcharge law, see People v. Brian L., 842 N.Y.S.2d 874 (City Ct. 2007).
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5. Make All State Law CollateralConsequencesDiscretionary
Automatic mandatory collateral consequences are inconsistent with
the pursuit of individualized justice and proportionality. The legislature
could vest the courts with more discretion to waive collateral consequences
where appropriate.
6. Challenges to Legislative Action
There are few groups with less legislative influence than criminal
defendants, even those who are generally law-abiding and brought into the
criminal justice system on noncriminal charges. For decades politicians
have won elections by being "tough on crime" and passing more punitive
laws.243 To object to punishment or decriminalize crime would certainly be
a risky political position. Similarly, quality-of-life initiatives have garnered
tremendous support from voters in rich and poor areas alike.2"
Nevertheless, none of the proposals above are about policing less, or about
sacrificing quality of life; they are merely about diminishing the costs
associated with these policies. These costs are not limited to those who are
arrested for minor offenses. Their families and communities are also
affected. Further, all taxpayers incur costs in the form of police overtime,
jail costs, and prison costs for those who receive longer sentences or parole
violations due to arrests for disorder, as well as public benefits for families
of those deprived of jobs because of a criminal record. Taxpayers also pay
for the excesses in the system in the form of civil damages and class action
suits for those wrongfully subjected to strip-searches245 and the thousands
arrested under unconstitutional loitering charges.246 ZTP costs to the
community are not merely economic. Law-abiding people of color incur
costs because ZTP reinforces stereotypes of criminality in black and
Latino individuals. Finally, there is an additional cost of ZTP, insofar as
ZTP fosters defiance and even criminality among individuals subjected to
processes that appear unfair, disproportionate, and arbitrary.
While the political incentives for change are few, the disincentives may
not be great either. It is not clear to me that a legislator who supported
sealing noncriminal records, expunging misdemeanor records after two,
three, or five years, or creating marijuana civil citations for first arrests
would be perceived as "soft on crime." Such tactics could minimize stigma
or divert thousands from the criminal justice system.

243.
voters by
244.
245.
246.

See Stuntz, supra note 227, at 529-33 (describing legislators' incentives to please
increasing convictions and taking popular symbolic stands against crime).
Kahan, supra note 37, at 2477-88.
Weiser, supra note 111.
See Livingston, supra note 40, at 555.
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B. The PoliceDepartment
In New York City, the police department is clearly in the best position
to change these policies. In the same way that NYPD Commissioner
Bratton and Mayor Giuliani adopted aggressive Zero Tolerance Policing
in the mid-1990s, the police department could adopt non-arrest models for
order-maintenance policing.
They could otherwise modify arrest
procedures as proposed in the discussion above and simply release people
with no significant record instead of taking them to arraignments. They
could also exercise discretion differently with regard to some offenses.2 47
Changing these policies would probably require no more consensus than
that of the Chief of Police and the Mayor. Nevertheless, the commitment
to such changes would have to be significant because the institutional
rewards at the NYPD are still largely determined by arrest numbers, and
salary for many officers is supplemented by overtime. Raises, rules about
overtime, and incentives to maintain order would have to be rethought.
Other models for successful policing that have led to the reduction of
crime and the improvement of quality of life certainly exist. In San Diego,
for example, problem-oriented policing that focused on developing
relations with communities and citizens to identify and address crime
brought crime down and increased satisfaction with police.248 In Boston, a
focus on a limited number of the most violent offenders resulted in a sharp
decrease in violent crime.249 Los Angeles has recently adopted this model
as well. This approach to policing may alleviate the sense among young
men of color that police are targeting them as a class. It could also stretch
police resources further. The number of uniformed officers has decreased
from a peak in 2000 of about 41,000250 to a fifteen year low of about
33,300,251 and starting salary 2 2 in the NYPD has also decreased in the last
247. In a major reversal of policy, the NYPD recently started issuing citations for open
bottles of alcohol. Eddy Ramirez, Drinking from a Brown Bag? Put Your Fine in an
Envelope, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2004, at B3. In 2007, over eleven thousand individuals
pleaded guilty and paid the fine by mail for public consumption of alcohol. CRIMINAL
COURT ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 109, at 38.
248. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 92 (2001).
249. For an account of how introducing psychological counseling into Boston prisons
brought about a decrease of violent crimes committed by former inmates and also reduced
the amount of intra-prison violence to nearly none, see generally JAMES GILLIGAN,

(Vintage Books 1997) (1996).
250. The NYPD had over 40,000 police officers in 2000. MaintainingHistoricallyLarge
Police Force Presents Challenges, INSIDE THE BUDGET (City of N.Y. Indep. Budget Office),
Sept. 29, 2000, at 1, availableat http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/newsfax/insidethebudget69.pdf.
251. NYPD May Scrap Jan '09 Recruits, TIMES NEWSWEEKLY, Dec. 4, 2008,
http://www.timesnewsweekly.com/news/2008/1204/localnews/032.html.
252. See C.J. Chivers & William K. Rashbaum, Army Lets a FelonJoin Up, but the New
York Police Will Not, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008, at A21 (noting that with a starting salary of
only $25,100, the police force had only 35,400 officers, fewer than the authorized 37,838).
VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC
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several years. Reducing arrest-related duties on hundreds of thousands of
arrests each year could permit base pay raises and expand units focused on
community relations and gang activities.
The empirical evidence suggests that consistent aggressive
misdemeanor policing is not necessary. The drop in misdemeanor arrests
in late 2001 and 2002 did not lead to an increase in crime. The fact that the
police make twice as many arrests on Wednesdays as on Sundays also
suggests that some of the thousands of arrests for minor offenses are not
necessary to keeping crime low. A pilot project eliminating some or all of
the discretionary arrests in a discrete area would yield evidence about
whether summary arrests are necessary to effective order-maintenance
policing.
C Prosecutors
Within the adversarial system, prosecutors are in the best position to
fashion responses that can reduce or eliminate costs to those arrested
under aggressive order-maintenance policing policies. As a general rule,
prosecutors have broad discretion about when and how to charge
defendants.2 3
Nevertheless, many offices put pressure on assistant
prosecutors to charge the highest available crime, to seek convictions as
often as possible, and to seek minimum sentences on offenses no matter
how minor. For all intents and purposes, New York City prosecutors have
been partners with the mayor and the NYPD in prosecuting quality-of-life
arrests.254 I have observed that the "standard offers" have gradually
increased in minor cases over the years-in the early 1990s an
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) was the result of nearly
any nonviolent first arrest-such that the Assistant District Attorneys now
routinely seek community service, treatment programs, and violation pleas
on first arrests.
What is missing from this calculus is systematic consideration of the
collateral consequences of these convictions. Given the divergence between
the punishment an Assistant District Attorney intends to impose-one day
of community service and a noncriminal conviction that will be sealed within
one year-and the consequences of the conviction-loss of home, income,
employment, immigration status, or ability to pay for an education-it is
time that the calculus be revised. It is clearly not enough to assert, as the
courts have, that the collateral consequences are not part of the punishment.
If District Attorneys represent the State of New York and have a duty to
253. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,365 (1978).
254. For a discussion of the active role of the New York County District Attorney's
Office in an undertaking to eliminate social disorder, see Scott Duffield Levy, The
Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order Through Disorder. New York's Narcotics
Eviction Program,43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 539, 543-45, 562-63, 578-80 (2008).
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protect the community, they cannot and should not close their eyes to the
unintended harm that a plea may entail.255
The first undertaking in this regard is education. Several articles have
addressed the need for defense counsel to learn of the many potential costs
of criminal and even noncriminal convictions; 216 the need is just as great for
prosecutors. Once the external costs are considered, prosecutors may
choose to consider declining prosecution, diversion, or the old expedient of
offering more ACDs. Certainly "standard offers" must be revised to take
into account collateral consequences. While defense counsel and judges
surely need to learn of these consequences too, it is fully within the
prosecutor's power to make office-wide decisions to avoid the unintended
consequences of convictions.
D. Courts
Courts have remarkably little power to eliminate many of the most
serious collateral consequences associated with minor offenses. They can
neither prevent arrests nor exercise discretion to dismiss or reduce
charges.257
There are, however, relatively simple scheduling
accommodations that would assist clients in challenging minor arrests.
First, the courts could establish night and weekend parts for defendants
who are employed so that they would not need to miss work to attend
court or pay fines. Second, the courts could adopt a uniform policy of
excusing defendants unless the prosecutor would be ready for a hearing or
trial, or a plea had been offered and communicated and would be
accepted. Third, courts already have discretion to reject pleas if they find
that they do not serve justice. Like prosecutors, courts could include
consideration of the collateral costs in these calculations and reject pleas
that were likely to result in consequences that violate or strain the
proportionality requirements of the criminal justice system.
It is important to emphasize that, in my opinion, community courts are
not a solution. Community courts that handle almost exclusively minor
255. Johnson, supra note 146, at 33 (arguing that because prosecutors must "seek
justice," they must consider mandatory collateral consequences in charging and pleading
recommendations).
256. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr. Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 740 (2002) (noting that
particularly in misdemeanor cases with "minimal direct consequences, the possibility of
innocent defendants pleading guilty also warrants a requirement that lawyers take
reasonable steps to ensure that their clients understand collateral consequences"): Pinard,
supra note 145, at 1071, 1073-75, 1088-90; NACDL, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE,
supra note 226, at 36, 40.
257. But cf id. at 32-33 (noting that one judge averted collateral consequences by
allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after serving his sentence, and explaining
how other judges might convict of misdemeanors at bench trials rather than felonies based
on the already harsh collateral consequences involved).
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offenses treat each like a major offense, requiring multiple appearances for
marijuana possession and other minor offenses.2 ' However, I do believe
the use of entirely noncriminal proceedings could have potentialparticularly if, like with the Transit Adjudication Bureau, a defendant
could have the immediate opportunity to be heard and solutions were
targeted towards the affected communities. 9
The Criminal Division in the Bronx that consolidates the felony and
misdemeanor court systems may be one promising reform. While this
reform does not reduce the collateral costs of minor arrests, it does address
procedural justice issues by allocating resources that permit more
misdemeanor trials.
Certainly, any effort to provide trials where
demanded would increase the legitimacy of our criminal courts in the eyes
of the public.
E. Defense Attorneys
How defense attorneys should handle collateral costs is the only
question that has been squarely addressed in the scholarship on collateral
consequences of misdemeanors, even though there is perhaps no actor less
able to control such consequences. Nevertheless, the defense attorney's
role is critical, as these earlier discussions demonstrate. The answers
provided thus far are two. In one view, the defense attorney must learn
what collateral consequences might flow from a conviction, advise her
client of these consequences, and counsel the client accordingly.2 61 In a
broader view, the defense attorney has a duty to represent the client
"holistically," not only making sure that the client is properly advised of
collateral consequences but also standing by the client and representing
the client in immigration, housing court, licensing, and reentry, among
others.26 ' While both answers are certainly part of the role the defense
attorney should undoubtedly play, they both also essentially accept the
brave new world of collateral consequences and costs. Further, most
defender offices are under-funded and lack the capacity to represent their
clients in the full range of collateral consequences. Those that do handle
civil consequences rely largely on grants that fund one or two overworked
specialists who handle the more serious repercussions of criminal
convictions. The typical institutional defense attorney, particularly those
handling misdemeanors, has so many cases in so many courtrooms that it is
258. See Rayner, supra note 114, at 1048.
259. All penalties collected by the Transit Adjudication Bureau are used for a transit
crime fund. N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 1209-a(1O) (McKinney 2008).
260. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide that, "[t]o the extent possible,
defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the
entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of
the contemplated plea." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.2(f) (1999).
261. See Pinard, supra note 145, at 1071, 1073-75, 1088-90.
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all that the defender can do to appear personally on the majority of cases.
Finally, for appointed counsel who are often solo practitioners, even those
who have managed to keep abreast of the myriad collateral consequences
would not be paid for related noncriminal representation for indigent
clients.
The holistic approach to collateral consequences should ideally
harness the strength of the defense bar to seek some of the policy and
practice reforms suggested above, rather than asking defense attorneys to
spend resources accompanying clients to administrative hearings across the
city. By rejecting "standard offers" with explicit reference to the
unintended collateral consequences, defense attorneys can educate
prosecutors and judges while also protecting clients. The system does not
have the capacity to try minor offenses, and organized use of that leverage
by rejecting pleas and demanding trials might result in improved
dispositions for clients.
While defense counsel should certainly try to ameliorate the
repercussions that follow an arrest, they are in the worst institutional
position to do so. Moreover, the defense bar-at least the attorneys who
represent the poor-have little political clout.
V.
CONCLUSION

The political incentives certainly are not well-aligned for any of the
players in the criminal justice system to make substantial inroads to reduce
the costs of aggressive order-maintenance policing. Yet the situation is not
hopeless. At a recent conference on the state of the criminal courts, a
working group of judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and court staff
came together and largely agreed that the glut of misdemeanors in New
York City Criminal Courts were leading to many of the collateral
consequences discussed above.262 With very few exceptions, those who
know the criminal justice system agree that there is a problem and a need
for reform.
Recognizing that order-maintenance policing is not synonymous with
Zero Tolerance Policing for minor crimes and noncriminal offenses is the
first step in addressing these problems. The second step is understanding
that such policies may in fact have a negative impact on order, economic
stability, and respect for law enforcement and the criminal justice system.
An important third step is assessing the scope of the impact of such
policies. The statistics provided in this paper provide a rough proxy for
beginning to undertake this inquiry. The hundreds of thousands of arrests
262. See Rayner, supra note 114, at 1047-51.
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and the myriad negative consequences and costs associated with aggressive
arrest policies provide a powerful argument in favor of taking steps to
eliminate some of these costs sooner rather than later. Most importantly,
longitudinal studies of the impact of minor arrests on defendants and their
families should be conducted. Crime mapping techniques and communitywide studies should be pursued to see how aggressive misdemeanor
policing affects different neighborhoods and economic groups. Finally,
issues of procedural justice should not be ignored in this research. One
wants to know not only the economic costs to individual, family,
community and the state, but also what costs are created in terms of
unwillingness to obey the law and cooperate with law enforcement by a
process that violates any notion of proportionality, denies defendants their
voices, and turns a blind eye to the question of guilt or innocence.
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